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Minds at War: China’s Pursuit of Military Advantage through Cognitive Science and Biotechnology
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PRISM 8, NO. 3
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Minds at War
China’s Pursuit of Military Advantage
through Cognitive Science and
Biotechnology
By Elsa B. Kania
The United States is starting to confront unprecedented challenges to the military and technological
superiority that it has enjoyed in recent history. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a
powerhouse across a range of emerging technologies, and Chinese leaders recognize today’s tech-
nological revolution as a critical, even historic, opportunity to achieve strategic advantage.1 As Chairman of
the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Commander-in-Chief of the CMC Joint Operations Center,
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has highlighted the importance of military
innovation to “keep pace with the times” (与时俱进) and adapt to the global revolution in military affairs.2
Indeed, Xi has declared, “In circumstances of increasingly intense global military competition, only
the innovators win.”3 Responding to this directive and imperative, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) has been actively exploring a range of new theories, capabilities, and technologies that are believed
to be critical to future operational advantage.4 The PLA is looking to improve its capacity to leverage aca-
demic and commercial developments in the process through China’s national strategy of “military-civil
fusion” (军民融合).5 In particular, Chinese innovation is poised to pursue synergies among brain science,
artificial intelligence (AI), and biotechnology that may have far-reaching implications for its future military
power and aggregate national competitiveness. Chinese military leaders appear to believe that such emerg-
ing technologies will be inevitably weaponized, often pointing to a quotation by Engels: “Once technological
advancements can be used for military purposes and have been used for military purposes, they very immedi-
ately and almost necessarily, often violating the commander’s will, cause changes or even transformations in
the styles of warfare.”6 The PLA intends to achieve an operational advantage through seizing the initiative in
the course of this transformation.
Chinese Military Innovation in the New Era
Chinese military scientists and strategists have often been animated in their thinking by concern with the
progression of the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) that is believed to be catalyzed by today’s
technological advancements.7 The PLA has closely examined the U.S. military’s approach to warfare, applying
Ms. Elsa B. Kania is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New
American Security. Her views are her own.

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lessons learned to its own military modernization in
seeking to catch up, while also looking for opportu-
nities to pursue asymmetric capabilities or attempt
to achieve a first-mover advantage to overtake
this “powerful adversary” (强敌). Since the 1990s,
Chinese military modernization has particularly
concentrated on pursuing a strategy of “informati-
zation” (信息化).8 Through this agenda, the PLA has
developed an array of command, control, commu-
nications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and concentrated
on advancing capabilities for information operations
(信息作战), including cyber warfare, electronic war-
fare, and psychological warfare.9
Today, PLA strategists anticipate a new
style of warfare is on the horizon, as the charac-
ter of conflict evolves from informatized toward
“intelligentized” (智能化) warfare, in which AI,
along with a range of technologies, is changing
the form of warfare.10 According to Lt. Gen. Liu
Guozhi (刘国治), Director of the Central Military
Commission Science and Technology Commission,
“AI will accelerate the process of military trans-
formation, ultimately leading to a profound
Revolution in Military Affairs . . . The combination
of artificial intelligence and human intelligence
can achieve the optimum, and human-machine
hybrid intelligence will be the highest form of
future intelligence.”11 This striking statement
highlights the PLA’s interest at the highest levels
in the notion of “hybrid intelligence” (混合智能),
a concept that implies a blending of human and
machine intelligence, including through leveraging
insights from brain science and such techniques
as the use of brain-computer interfaces.12 This
concept is not merely abstract but is starting to be
realized through new programs, including projects
intended to promote human performance enhance-
ment. Future intelligentized operations (智能化作
战) are expected to involve prominent employment
of intelligent autonomy (智能自主) in weapons
systems under conditions of multi-domain integra-
tion (多域一体) with command exercised through
brain-machine integration, enabled by cloud
infrastructure.13 Chinese military scientists and
strategists expect that this revolution in warfare
will also demand transformation of the human
element of warfare, which may require seeking
command of the brain and biological sciences.
Reforming for Innovation
China’s military reforms have elevated the impor-
tance of innovation in ways that could contribute
to the PLA’s ability to overcome prior difficulties.
In this new era of Chinese military power, the PLA
is seeking to reorient toward a model that lever-
ages science and technology as core enablers of
combat capabilities.14 Pursuant to the reforms, the
PLA has created the CMC Steering Committee on
Military Scientific Research, which is responsible
for establishing high-level priorities and strategic
directions.15 The CMC Science and Technology
Commission (S&TC) has also been elevated to
lead and guide military technological innovation
and to promote military-civil fusion.16 The S&TC
oversees a number of plans, programs, and expert
groups of top scientists for priorities that include
human-machine fusion intelligence and biotechnol-
ogy.17 The CMC S&TC also has launched a plan and
fund focused on cutting-edge technologies, and its
“rapid response small group” on defense innovation
is looking to help the PLA improve its capacity to
leverage commercial technologies, including new
techniques for human-machine interaction.18
China’s military scientific enterprise has been
transformed in the course of the PLA’s reforms.19
The PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS),
which has been responsible traditionally for issues of
strategy and doctrine, has been officially designated
to lead the PLA’s military scientific enterprise.20
AMS has launched the National Innovation Institute
for Defense Technology (国防科技创新研究院),

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which includes research institutes that focus on not
only unmanned systems and artificial intelligence
but also frontier/cutting-edge interdisciplinary
(前沿交叉) technologies,21 such as biotechnology
and quantum technology.22 The leadership of AMS
also possesses the expertise and authority to pro-
mote these new directions in military innovation.
Notably, Lt. Gen. Yang Xuejun (杨学军), who is
known for his research in supercomputing and arti-
ficial intelligence, has become its President as of July
2017.23 As Vice President, Maj. Gen. He Fuchu (贺福
初), formerly President of the Academy of Military
Medical Sciences (AMMS), is known for his research
interests in genomics and bioinformatics, and he has
also been prominent in emphasizing the importance
of biotechnology as a new “strategic commanding
heights” (制高点) of strategic competition.24 Their
selection to lead AMS appears to highlight the extent
to which the PLA has prioritized these strategic
technologies as a new direction for its development.
The PLA’s paradigm for military innova-
tion looks to promote integration of theory and
technology to advance the development of new
concepts and capabilities.25 Notably, the CMC
S&TC has been funding a program on biological
interdisciplinary sciences and technology. This
initiative includes projects on military brain sci-
ence, advanced biomimetic systems, biological and
biomimetic materials, and human enhancement.26
In parallel with the China Brain Project, which
has been launched as a national initiative for the
2016–30 timeframe, the CMC S&TC also appears
to have launched a military brain science project
that is exploring the potential of advances in neu-
roscience for military applications.27 According
to Hu Dewen (胡德文), a prominent researcher
from the PLA’s National University of Defense
Technology (NUDT), the PLA should recognize
the concurrent importance of and relationship
among artificial intelligence, biological intelli-
gence, and hybrid intelligence.28
PLA Expectations for Future Warfare
Chinese strategists anticipate that the tempo and
complexity of operations will increase, perhaps
dramatically, as the form (形态) or character of
warfare continues to evolve.29 As a result, PLA
thinkers are concerned about the intense cognitive
challenges that future commanders will encounter,
particularly considering the importance of opti-
mizing human-machine coordination (人机协同)
and fusion or integration (人机融合).30 Necessarily,
these trends have intensified the PLA’s interest in
the military relevance of not only artificial intelli-
gence but also brain science and new directions in
biological interdisciplinary (生物交叉) technolo-
gies, ranging from biosensing and biomaterials to
options for human enhancement.31 The transition
from informatization to intelligentization is seen
as necessitating the upgrading of human cognitive
performance to keep pace with the complexity
of warfare.
In future conflict, the battlefield is expected to
extend into new virtual domains. According to He
Fuchu, “The sphere of operations will be expanded
from the physical domain and the information
domain to the domain of consciousness (意识域);
the human brain will become a new combat space.”32
Consequently, success on the future battlefield will
require achieving not only “biological dominance”
(制生权) but also “mental/cognitive dominance”
(制脑权) and “intelligence dominance” (制智权).33
These nascent concepts, which are becoming more
regularly discussed in influential writings, reflect
the PLA’s recognition of the increasing importance
of contesting superiority within these new frontiers
to achieving advantage.34 Despite the complexity
and capability of advanced technologies, this human
element of warfare remains a critical vulnerability
and source of potential advantage. At the same time,
the notion of “winning without fighting” (不战而屈
人之兵) is a traditional element of Chinese strategic
thinking that possesses enduring relevance in an era

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in which technology is becoming ever more conse-
quential to strategic competition in peacetime.35
Human and Artificial Intelligence on
the Future Battlefield
The PLA recognizes the advent of AI as a challenge
and opportunity to seize the initiative in future mil-
itary competition.36 In fact, some military academics
even anticipate that AI “will transcend firepower,
machine power, and information power, becoming
the most critical factor in determining the outcome
of warfare.”37 In future “intelligentized operations,”
algorithmic advantage could become a dominant
determinant of operational advantage, yet operations
to subvert and counter an adversary’s intelligentized
capabilities (“逆智能化”) are also seen as potentially
advantageous, particularly for a weaker military.38
Indeed, AI also possesses a number of limitations
at present, including on issues of safety and security
that may render it vulnerable to exploitation.
PLA scholars and strategists are continuing
to debate the appropriate relationship between
human and machine intelligence on the battle-
field.39 In an authoritative commentary, the CMC
Joint Staff Department urged the PLA to take
advantage of the “tremendous potential” of AI in
operational command, planning and deductions,
and decision support.40 Whereas some scholars have
warned against autonomous decisionmaking, other
researchers have differentiated between the even-
tual necessity for automation or “intelligentization”
of command decisionmaking at the tactical level of
warfare, the importance of the delegation of com-
mand authorities in campaigns, and the imperative
of human control in strategic decisionmaking, in
which AI can take on a supporting function.41 PLA
thinkers recognize the importance of leveraging the
relative strengths of human and machine intelli-
gence respectively, and this interaction necessitates
progress in techniques for human-machine coordi-
nation in combat.
These dynamics of future intelligentized oper-
ations elevate the criticality of cognition. A growing
number of PLA scholars and strategists have argued
that “mental/cognitive dominance” (制脑权) and
“intelligence dominance” (制智权), concepts that
are characterized as interrelated or sometimes syn-
onymous in recent writings, will become the key
points of struggle (制权争夺点).42 Unlike traditional
operations, the confrontation is occurring increas-
ingly in the space of human intelligence (人的智力
空间) and inherently involves “competition for cog-
nitive speed and quality advantage,” which can be
enabled by data fusion.43 The importance of speed,
efficiency, and flexibility in intelligentized opera-
tions has provoked consideration of not only options
for intelligent decision support systems,44 but also
“brain-machine fusion” (脑机融合) as a future
paradigm for command and control, which would
require integrating the art of command with emerg-
ing scientific and technological advancements.45
The notion of brain control (脑控) primarily
involves brain-machine/computer interface (脑–机
接口) technology that is intended to enable efficient
human-machine integration (人机融合), and PLA
researchers continue to explore multiple modalities
of human-machine interaction for command and
control.46 At the same time, cognitive enhancement,
such as through the use of transcranial magnetic
stimulation, could be leveraged to achieve an advan-
tage in complex battlefield environments, in which
there will be a high degree of integration between
humans and weapons systems.47
PLA strategists believe that achieving “men-
tal dominance” (制脑权) will be critical in future
military competition across the spectrum from
peacetime to warfighting.48 Increasingly, this con-
cept has recurred in PLA writings that emphasize
the criticality of the “cognitive domain” (认知领
域), which involves “the field of decision-making
through reasoning,” as the speed and complexity of
conflict continue to increase.49 Success in subverting

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an adversary’s cognition can enable “winning
without fighting.”50 The increased integration of
human cognition with technology influences mil-
itary perception confrontation (军事感知对抗),
which involves attempts to hinder and distort the
adversary’s cognition, whether through technical,
physiological, or psychological techniques.51 In an
era of informatized warfare, conflict in the cognitive
domain attempts to undermine the adversary’s will
and resolve, undermine perception and command
capabilities to weaken fighting spirit, and manip-
ulate decisionmaking.52 The study of operations
undertaken by the U.S. and Russian militaries has
also influenced Chinese military thinking on the
importance of psychological operations, but PLA
thinkers are seeking to innovate their own tactics
and concepts of operations,53 including exploring
the potential employment of intelligent agents to
enable “guidance” of public opinion.54 In particu-
lar, the prominence of social media and advances in
artificial intelligence, including such techniques as
deep fakes, have created new options for subversion
and manipulation. The PLA is actively pursuing
research and the development of capabilities, which
could range from the use of the drug Modafinil for
performance enhancement, to leveraging insights
from brain science and psychology to target and
exploit inherent vulnerabilities in human cognition.
While apparently enthusiastic about the offensive
potential of such options, the PLA is concerned
about the potential for subversion of its own forces,
including persistent anxieties about the prospects of
color revolution.55
Consequently, the pursuit of advances in military
brain science is recognized as important to advancing
future battlefield effectiveness.56 In particular, this
new domain in military competition is seen as vari-
ously involving attempts to “imitate the brain”
(仿脑), leverage “brain control” (脑控), “enhance the
brain” (超脑), or “control the brain” (“控脑”).57 On
the battlefield, attempts to undermine an adversary
could include interfering with the adversary’s capacity
for cognition, whether through manipulation or out-
right destruction, from disrupting the flow of data to
exploiting ideology or emotion.58 Increasingly, “men-
tal confrontation” (脑对抗) could become a major
feature of future conflicts, involving attack, defense,
and enhancement of the brain.59 Maj. Gen. He Fuchu
has anticipated the development of “a new brain-con-
trol weaponry” that interferes with and controls
people’s consciousness, thereby subverting combat
styles.60 Concretely, Zhou Jin (周瑾), a researcher with
the Institute of Military Cognition and Brain Science
at AMMS, has concentrated on brain science and
neural engineering, and his research has also contrib-
uted to an expert group on psychological warfare and
cognitive technology through the CMC Science and
Technology Commission.61
The PLA’s intended integration of human and
machine intelligence could be eventually facili-
tated by advances in brain-machine interfaces. For
instance, at the PLA’s National University of Defense
Technology (NUDT), the Cognitive Science Basic
Research Team (认知科学基础研究团队) has been
engaged in research on brain-machine interfaces
(脑机接口) for more than 20 years, such that this
technology can now be used to operate a robot, drive
a vehicle, or even to operate a computer, enabled
by the processing of EEG signals.62 “Combining
the high functioning of the machine with the high
intelligence of human beings to achieve high perfor-
mance of equipment systems, this is an important
domain of application in intelligent science,”
according to Hu Dewen (胡德文), who has led this
program.63 In the PLA’s Information Engineering
University’s Information Systems Engineering
College, Tong Li (通李) has been engaged in
research on intelligent information processing and
brain-computer interaction (脑机交互), which has
been reportedly leveraged to enable brain con-
trol of a drone or robot.64 Meanwhile, at AMMS,
Wang Changyong (王常勇), Deputy Director of the

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Institute of Military Cognition and Brain Science,
has engaged in research on brain-machine inter-
faces, variously pursuing EEGs (via the scalp) and
implants in the cranial nerves of macaques, which
are believed to be an apt model to simulate human
cognition, concentrating on neural information
acquisition.65 The complexity of these challenges are
seen as increasing the importance of sophisticated
simulations in combat laboratories that can explore
the efficacy of these human-machine synergies.66
In advancing these techniques, the PLA could
leverage academic research and commercial devel-
opments. For instance, Tsinghua University, which
is actively supporting military-civil fusion, has been
pursuing research on human-machine interaction
(人机协作) with funding from the CMC Science and
Technology Commission.67 In Tianjin, a local action
plan has called for research in brain-computer
interface technologies, including brain-controlled
unmanned systems and even automatic sniper
rifles.68 At Tianjin University, the Academy of
Military Science and the Chinese Academy of
Launch Vehicle Technology have both established
joint laboratories and partnerships that concentrate
on innovation in human-machine hybrid intelli-
gence (人机混合智能).69 The State Key Laboratory
of Cognitive Science and Learning, based at Beijing
Normal University, has also pursued initiatives in
military-civil fusion.70
Pursuant to military-civil fusion, Chinese
advances in brain-computer interface research
undertaken by academic institutions or commercial
enterprises may eventually have military relevance.
During the past couple of years, the Chinese gov-
ernment has convened a national competition on
brain-computer interfaces, of which the PLA NUDT
is a co-sponsor.71 In addition, AMMS researchers
have engaged with a commercial enterprise that
is specializing in the development of EEG prod-
ucts, known as Cogrowth (ku chengzhang, 酷成
长), which has concentrated in its products on
brain-computer interface and intelligent control
with applications that include attention and memory
training.72 Meanwhile, Tianjin University and the
China Electronics Corporation have achieved new
breakthroughs in research on a brain-computer
interface (BCI) chip, known as “Brain Talker,” which
is specially designed to decode brainwave informa-
tion.73 The advantages of this chip are described as
including its size, precision, efficiency in decod-
ing information, and increased capability for fast
communication, all of which can contribute to the
realization of BCI technologies.74 According to its
designers, “this BC3 (Brain-Computer Codec Chip)
has the ability to discriminate minor neural electri-
cal signals and decode their information efficiently,
which can greatly enhance the speed and accuracy
of brain-computer interfaces.”75 So too, as combat
platforms are expected to progress from “informati-
zation” to “low intelligentization” to “brain-like high
intelligentization,” such breakthroughs in brain-like
computing chips are anticipated to be important to
advancing autonomy.76
As the cognitive demands for commanders
are expected to become more acute on the future
battlefield, new directions in integrating human and
machine intelligence could prove militarily advanta-
geous. Through leveraging “brain networking” (脑
联网), a “combat brain” (作战大脑) can be devel-
oped for the future battlefield, which is expected to
enhance the cognitive and decisionmaking capa-
bilities of military commanders, including through
improving their cognitive capability and understand-
ing of the battlefield situation, according to NUDT
scholars.77 Hypothetically, a so-called “network of
brains” could accelerate real-time transmission of
data on the battlefield, based on leveraging brain-ma-
chine interfaces to facilitate communication between
commanders and their units. Wu Haitao (吴海涛), a
researcher with AMMS, has postulated;
“Brain networking” technologies are far
from mature, but we have good reason to

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believe that bio-intelligence networks based
on brain intelligence will inevitably sur-
pass existing informatized technology and
weak artificial intelligence technologies. The
development and application of related tech-
nologies will inevitably accelerate disruptive
transformations in the military domain. In
the future, a brain-to-brain collaborative
combat platform or system based on “brain
networks” may be exploited, which can be
expected to achieve high-level optimization
and integration of battlefield perception,
logistics support, weaponry and command
systems, maximize combat links and com-
mand effectiveness, so as to capture fleeting
opportunities in the ever-changing battlefield
situation and achieve unexpected victories.78
The notion of brain networking through brain-
to-brain interfacing may sound fanciful, but there
are initial experimental indications that this could
become a technical possibility. For instance, in an
experiment at Zhejiang University, researchers
created a so-called rat cyborg through implanting
microelectrodes into the brain of a live rat, which
connected it to the brain of a human “manipulator”
who had been connected to a computer brain-ma-
chine interface, by which the rat was directed to
navigate a maze.79
The future trajectory of such advances could
be shaped by the continued implementation of the
China Brain Project, which was launched in 2016.80
The project, which was initially initiated in response
to the U.S. brain science program, is recognized
as a megaproject for the 2016–2030 timeframe.81 It
may receive billions in funding once fully realized.82
The leading researcher involved in the design of
this project, Mu-Ming Pu of the Chinese Academy
of Sciences, has described this project as involving
“two wings,” encompassing not only brain science
but the intersection between brain science and
artificial intelligence, which is believed to be highly
promising.83 The focus on imitation of the brain
often involves brain-like and brain-inspired intel-
ligence, which is a high-level priority highlighted
in China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence
Development Plan and operationalized through a
new national laboratory dedicated to the topic.84 In
addition, in September 2015, Beijing’s Science and
Technology Commission announced the launch of a
special project on brain science research to con-
centrate on brain cognition, brain medicine, and
brain-like computing. This center plans to support
projects that leverage new biomedical techniques,
including high-throughput single-gene sequencing
and precise genome editing, enabled by big-data
processing.85 The involvement of AMMS is notable
but hardly surprising considering that neuroscience
has been highlighted as a priority in China’s plans
for military-civil fusion, and there may be inter-
esting synergies between academic research and
potential military applications.86
This research agenda is starting to translate
into practical advances. For instance, the Tianjic
chip leverages a brain-inspired architecture, and
its designers claim that it represents an important
progression toward artificial general intelligence
that is comparable to humans in its capabilities.87
As one prominent academic highlighted, “Human
beings have gradually entered the era of artificial
intelligence, but the understanding of the essence of
what constitutes ‘intelligence’ remains unclear. The
study of brain and cognition will promote people’s
understanding of the essence of ‘intelligence’ and
promote the development of related technologies
and industries.”88 Seemingly speculatively, these
attempts at imitating human cognition have been
described as possessing the potential to extend to the
development of highly intelligent weapons systems
capable of reasoning and judgment comparable to
that of a human.89
Within the same timeframe, the CMC S&TC
has also launched a military brain science plan and

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projects that appear to be occurring in parallel—
and perhaps with some degree of integration or
coordination—with China’s national brain science
project.90 For instance, Wu Shengxi (武胜昔), a pro-
fessor with the Fourth Military Medical University
who is engaged in both initiatives, has concentrated
his research on the plasticity of the central nervous
circuits and mechanisms of advanced brain func-
tion.91 His activities have included collaboration
with a senior scientist from MIT’s Broad Institute
and the McGovern Institute for a project on the
anterior cingulate cortex, a region of the brain that
“plays a role in fundamental cognitive processes,
including cost-benefit calculation, motivation,
and decisionmaking.”92 Chinese academic and
military medical institutions have concentrated
on the expansion of military brain science, which
has been prioritized for support and funding.93
Overall, the discipline of military cognitive neu-
roscience continues to evolve and involves several
interrelated research directions, which can include
brain monitoring (for example, to measure and
assess the military mental work); brain modulation
(mind-controlling targets and effects); brain dam-
age; and brain promotion (neuro-scientific training
methods).94 For instance, the first seminar convened
on brain science research and military-civil fusion
collaborative innovation concentrated on core com-
petencies of battlefield perception, command and
control, target striking, identifying ten key research
directions for such military cognitive capabilities
(军事认知能力).95
Chinese research is anticipated to have cer-
tain potential advantages in this field. China’s
rapidly aging population presents an acute socie-
tal challenge but also an opportunity to leverage
sizable amounts of data about brain disease.96 At
the same time, the prevalence of primate research
in China could prove another significant advan-
tage. At a time when the United States and Europe
have started to cut back on primate research due to
ethical concerns and expense, these programs have
continued to expand in China with robust state
support.97 The Chinese government has undertaken
significant investments to expand its own neurosci-
ence research with non-human primates, which are
believed to be “ideal animal models for understand-
ing human brain and cognition.”98 In particular,
China has become a global center for research
involving macaque monkeys, which are seen as well-
suited as a model for research on the human brain.99
In one notable study, researchers introduced the
MCPH1 gene, which is believed to be linked to brain
development, into embryos to create transgenic
macaque monkeys that demonstrated improved per-
formance on short-term memory tasks, while also
displaying a longer process of brain development,
such as that characteristic of humans.100 This study
was described as “the first attempt to experimentally
interrogate the genetic basis of human brain origin
using transgenic monkey models.101 Similarly, in
another greatly controversial undertaking, research-
ers have been creating embryos that represent
“human-animal chimeras”—in this case, monkey
embryos to which human cells are added.102 These
changes in the Shank3 gene are expected to cause
mutations in the brains of monkeys that have been
Game-changing synthetic biology research
may enable future capabilities for Soldiers
(U.S. Army Photo by Eric Proctor and Autumn
Kulaga)

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edited.103 The use of gene editing to improve models
for studying the brain illustrates the important
intersections between cognitive science and biotech-
nology, which has emerged as a parallel emphasis for
the PLA.104
Biotechnology on the Future
Battlefield
The PLA’s keen interest in the impact of biology on
military affairs is also reflected in strategic writings
and research that argue today’s advances in biology
are contributing to an ongoing evolution in the form
or character (形态) of conflict.105 In one prominent
example, Guo Jiwei (郭继卫), a professor with the
Third Military Medical University, wrote War for
Biological Dominance (制生权战争), published in
2010, highlighting the multifaceted applications of
biology in future warfare.106 PLA researchers with the
Academy of Military Medical Sciences have high-
lighted that advances in science and technology drive
evolution in the character of conflict, raising the
concept of “biology-enabled” warfare
(生物化战争).107 The PLA also sees synthetic biol-
ogy as a domain with great military potential.108
Unsurprisingly, the PLA has been concerned with
advances in biotechnology in the United States
and worldwide, particularly the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency’s launch of the Biological
Technologies Office. The Chinese government has
highlighted biotechnology as an industry that prom-
ises major commercial advantages, and China’s plans
and initiatives for military-civil fusion have priori-
tized biology as a critical sector.109 Beyond outright
military research, there is an emerging ecosystem of
academic and commercial enterprises that is or could
become involved in supporting military research.
Increasingly, the PLA is starting to recognize
biology as a new domain of warfare and elevating
its importance in strategic thinking. The concept
of biological dominance (制生权) could be ren-
dered as “command and superiority in biology,”
and PLA scientists and scholars are continuing to
work toward developing more cohesive theories
around these ideas that could contribute to future
concepts of operations.110 In the new RMA, biotech-
nology will become the new “strategic commanding
heights,” declared He Fuchu, then president of the
Academy of Military Medical Sciences, in 2015.111
He has remained a prominent advocate for the mil-
itarization of biotechnology. Since 2016, Maj. Gen.
He has also been appointed to serve on the CMC
S&TC, which promotes military-civil fusion and
technological innovation, where he may be involved
in guiding research on biology and interdisciplin-
ary technologies, from biomimetic and biomaterials
to biosensing technology, that could contribute to
future advances in weaponry.112 He has predicted,
“As the weaponization of living organisms will
become a reality in the future, non-traditional com-
bat styles will be staged, and the ‘biological frontier’
(生物疆域) will become a new frontier for national
defense.”113 He goes on to say that;
Biological interdisciplinary technology
will make future combat platforms move
toward human-computer integration and
intelligentization. In the future, human-
like brain information processing systems
will achieve revolutionary breakthroughs,
such as high-performance low-power
computing, highly intelligent autonomous
decision-making, active learning, and
continuous increases in intelligentization,
promoting the emergence of highly intelli-
gentized and autonomous combat forces.114
Certain elements of PLA strategic thinking
on the offensive potential of these technologies are
troubling. Notably, the 2017 edition of Science of
Military Strategy (战略学), a textbook published by
the National Defense University that is typically
considered relatively authoritative, introduced a new
section dedicated to the topic of military struggle

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in the domain of biology. While this book does not
mention CRISPR specifically, it notes that new kinds
of biological warfare could be targeted, employing
“specific ethnic genetic attacks” (特定种族基因攻
击). Disturbingly, the discussion of this possibility is
repeated across a number of PLA writings.115 Indeed,
“biological deterrence” (生物威慑) should be con-
sidered a new kind of deterrence that is enabled by
advances in biotechnology, including the potential
for “ethnic-specific genetic weapons” (“种族特异
性基因武器”), according to Zeng Huafeng (曾华
锋) of the PLA’s NUDT.116 “Due to the high lethal-
ity, low cost and diverse means of genetic attack, it
will have a profound impact on future wars” in ways
that could increase the destructiveness of warfare,
according to NUDT researcher Shi Haiming (石海
明).117 As a result, the outcome of war may no longer
determined by the destruction of combat, but rather
there could be further blurring of the boundar-
ies between peace and warfare.118 These relatively
authoritative discussions of the potential for genetic
attacks remain ambiguous but are troubling none-
theless, given the emergence of technologies that
create new possibilities in gene editing.119
To date, China has been leading in early trials
of CRISPR in not only animals but also human
patients.120 The emergence of Chinese research as
a new frontier for experimentation with CRISPR
reflects factors that include lesser regulatory
requirements and robust support and enthusiasm
for leveraging these technologies. To date, CRISPR
research in China has concentrated heavily on appli-
cations in agriculture and for medical or therapeutic
purposes.121 It is also striking that a significant
proportion of the research in CRISPR is occurring at
Chinese military medical and research institutions,
especially the PLA General Hospital.122 The central-
ity of PLA institutions in this CRISPR research is
concerning when juxtaposed with known pro-
grams and indications of military interest in human
enhancement. In one notable example, a student at
the Academy of Military Medical Science wrote a
doctoral dissertation in 2016 titled “Research on the
Evaluation of Human Performance Enhancement
Technology.”123 This dissertation pointed to
CRISPR-CAS as one of three primary “human per-
formance enhancement technologies” (人效能增强
技术) that can be employed to increase the combat
effectiveness of military personnel.124 The researcher
dissertation highlights that CRISPR holds “great
potential” as a “disruptive” technology, arguing
that therefore China must “grasp the initiative.”
Although the practical application for performance
enhancement appears to remain a more distant pos-
sibility at this point, such research provides at the
very least indication of interest and concern.
Although the use of CRISPR as a technique
for gene editing remains novel and nascent, these
tools and techniques are rapidly advancing, and
what is within the realm of the possible for mili-
tary applications may continue to shift as well. In
the meantime, throughout China, gene editing is
already under way in animals, human embryos,
and even in clinical trials. In the process, BGI,
formerly known as Beijing Genomics Inc., has
been very active in CRISPR research.125 BGI has
also provoked controversy after attempting to
commercialize genetic editing of animals, such as
mini-pigs as pets, and from pursuing research on
the genetic basis of intelligence by soliciting DNA
from geniuses.126 Of course, gene editing today
remains constrained by persistent difficulties, such
as the issue of limiting off-target effects, which can
cause unintended consequences in the genome.127
However, current research has continued to work
toward making gene editing more precise and
practical, and BGI has established an edge in
cheap gene sequencing, concentrating on amass-
ing massive amounts of data from a diverse array
of sources.128 BGI has achieved a global presence,
including laboratories in California and Australia,
and its activities have continued to expand.129

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The Chinese government clearly believes that
national genetic resources possess strategic sig-
nificance. China’s National Genebank, which is
administered by BGI, was launched in 2016, and it
is intended to become the world’s largest. By some
accounts, its establishment was motivated at least
partly by issues of biosecurity, particularly that of
Chinese genomic information then being stored in
overseas facilities.130 This new Chinese genebank
has been described as intended to “develop and
utilize China’s valuable genetic resources, safeguard
national security in bioinformatics, and enhance
China’s capability to seize the strategic command-
ing heights” in the domain of biotechnology. These
concerns about the potential strategic significance
of genetic resources have also resulted in an unwill-
ingness to share and exchange data, even as Chinese
companies are avidly seeking out access to sources
of data beyond China.131
The processing of such massive amounts of
genetic information requires powerful supercom-
puters. In the process, BGI affiliates have been
engaged in research collaboration with the NUDT,
including the development of tools and insights
that may contribute to enabling future gene edit-
ing.132 In particular, one former professor who
remains affiliated with the NUDT has also main-
tained a position with BGI as a specially appointed
professor.133 Their research concentrates on bioin-
formatics, leveraging supercomputers, namely the
Tianhe, for the processing of genetic information
in biomedical applications.134 Such collaboration
with NUDT researchers is not necessarily sur-
prising.135 However, such confluence of troubling
sentiments in military writings, ongoing programs
funding research on human enhancement, and
collaboration between military and commercial
institutions raises questions that merit further
scrutiny from a policy perspective, particularly
considering the range of potential implications of
BGI’s research.136
Looking forward, the application of machine
learning to the analysis of genomic information
could enable the discovery of patterns and insights
that may prove actionable. China has also been at
the forefront of parallel progress in precision medi-
cine that is enabled by the embrace of AI for medical
applications. In the field of AI, China has been
sometimes characterized as possessing an advantage
in data. However, the actual impact of data depends
on context, techniques, and intended applications.
It seems more likely that China could possess and
achieve a data advantage in genomics and biomed-
ical technologies, based on the sizable amounts
of genomic and medical data that have been and
continue to be collected. This access to genomic
information combined with continued advances in
artificial intelligence could contribute to advances in
understanding of the evolution of the human brain
and genomic determinants of intelligence.137 So too,
the study of the human genome and its comparison
with that of other primates can contribute to iden-
tifying which specific genomic differences account
for the uniqueness of the human brain. Potentially,
such insights can also enable future augmentation of
human intelligence in ways that enable the “mental
dominance” and superiority in intelligentized oper-
ations that the PLA believes is essential to success in
future warfare.
Conclusions and Implications
Although technological advantage has been a key
pillar of U.S. military power and national com-
petitiveness, China is catching up, aspiring to take
the lead in today’s strategic technologies. Pursuing
military innovation as a priority and national imper-
ative, the Chinese military appears to be enthused
with the possibility that today’s RMA could disrupt
the future military balance to its advantage. Today,
China possesses a stronger technological founda-
tion for future military power, despite confronting
continued challenges in the development of “key

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and core” (关键核心) technologies, and the PLA is
looking to improve its capacity to leverage academic
and commercial advancements to enable future
military capabilities, including artificial intelligence,
biotechnology, and quantum technology.
The PLA is greatly concerned about being
subject to technological surprise and equally con-
cerned with opportunities to achieve it. Future
primacy in these fields, which could prove import-
ant to future military advantage, may remain
highly contested between the United States and
China. However, the process of military innovation
that is required to operationalize these capabilities
will prove inherently challenging, and the feasibil-
ity of certain aspects of the PLA’s strategic thinking
and theoretical explorations remains to be seen. Of
course, these technologies remain quite nascent,
and the process of research, development, experi-
mentation, and operationalization that is required
to realize their full potential may be lengthy and
complex, requiring adjustments that are challeng-
ing for any bureaucracy.
However, the PLA today is fighting to inno-
vate. It is striking that the PLA has introduced
major changes and reforms to its military scientific
enterprise, including through efforts to recruit and
support more junior scientists, while also recruit-
ing more civilians for technical positions. The
prominence of military scientists in PLA leader-
ship may also provide powerful champions for this
agenda. Ultimately, Xi Jinping’s demand that the
PLA pursue innovation could serve as a power-
ful impetus for peacetime innovation, even as the
ideological constraints upon an authoritarian mil-
itary that is de facto the armed wing of the Chinese
Communist Party could impede creativity and
initiative. The future trajectory of these concepts
and potential capabilities will merit continued
analytic and academic attention as such research
progresses. PRISM
Notes
1 “The CCP Central Committee and State Council
Release the ‘National Innovation-Driven Development
Strategy Outline’” [中共中央 国务院印发《国家创新驱动
发展战略纲要], Xinhua, May 19, 2016, available at <http://
news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-05/19/c_1118898033.
htm>. See also Xi Jinping’s remarks on this approach
in the context of military modernization: “Xi Jinping:
Comprehensively Advance an Innovation-Driven
Development Strategy; Promote New Leapfrogging
in National Defense and Military Construction” [
习近平:全面实施创新驱动发展战略 推动国防
和军队建设实现新跨越], Xinhua, March 13, 2016,
available at <http://news.Xinhuanet.com/politics/2016l-
h/2016-03/13/c_1118316426.htm>.
2 “Xi Jinping: Accurately Grasp the New Trends in
Global Military Developments and Keep Pace with the
Times, Strongly Advancing Military Innovation” [习近平:
准确把握世界军事发展新趋势 与时俱进大力推进军事
创新], Xinhua, August 30, 2014, available at <http://news.
xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-08/30/c_1112294869.htm>.
3 See, for instance Xi Jinping’s remarks as quoted
in this article: “Scientific and Technological Innovation,
A Powerful Engine for the World-Class Military” [
科技创新,迈向世界一流军队的强大引擎], Xinhua,
September 15, 2017, available at <http://www.gov.cn/xin-
wen/2017-09/15/content_5225216.htm>.
4 “The CCP Central Committee and State Council
Release the ‘National Innovation-Driven Development
Strategy Outline.’”
5 “Xi Jinping’s Talk on Military-Civil Fusion:
Regarding the Whole Outlook for National Security
and Development“ [习近平谈军民融合:关乎国家安全
和发展全局], Seeking Truth [求是], October 16, 2018,
available at <http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/rdjj/2018-
10/16/c_1123565364.htm>.
6 Cai Yubin [蔡渭滨] and Huang Xuebin [黄雪斌],
“Vigorously Cultivate the Fighting Spirit of Scientific and
Technological Personnel” [大力培育科技人员的战斗精
神], PLA Daily, May 6, 2019, available at <http://www.xin-
huanet.com/mil/2019-05/06/c_1210126997.htm>.
7 “Xi Jinping: Accurately Grasp the New Trend in
Global Military Developments.”
8 For an earlier perspective on this RMS, see
Jacqueline Newmyer, “The Revolution in Military Affairs
with Chinese Characteristics,” The Journal of Strategic
Studies 33, no. 4 (2010): 483–504; You Ji, “Learning and
Catching Up: China’s Revolution in Military Affairs
Initiative,” in The Information Revolution in Military
Affairs in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004),
97–123; Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase,
“Informatization and the Chinese People’s Liberation

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MINDS AT WAR
Army Navy,” in The Chinese Navy: Expanding
Capabilities, Evolving Roles, ed. Phillip Saunders et al.
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,
2011): 247–287.
9 Ye Zheng [叶证], Lectures on the Science of
Information Operations [信息作战科学教程] (Beijing:
Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013).
10 “Xi Jinping’s Report at the Chinese Communist
Party 19th National Congress” [习近平在中国共产党
第十九次全国代表大会上的报告]; “Experts: Military
Intelligentization Is Not Merely Artificial Intelligence”
[专家:军事智能化绝不仅仅是人工智能], People’s Daily,
December 6, 2017, available at <http://military.people.
com.cn/n1/2017/1206/c1011-29689750.htm>.
11 “Lt. Gen. Liu Guozhi: The Development of Military
Intelligentization Is a Strategic Opportunity for our
Military to Turn Sharply to Surpass” [刘国治中将:军事
智能化发展是我军弯道超车的战略机遇], CCTV News,
October 22, 2017, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.
cn/china/2017-10-22/doc-ifymzqpq3312566.shtml>.
12 Ibid.
13 “Setting off a new revolution in military affairs?
Six key words to interpret intelligentized operations”
[掀起新的军事革命?六大关键词解读智能化作战], PLA
Daily, March 1, 2018, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.
com/mil/2018-03/01/c_129819887.htm>
14 See the latest defense white paper that pro-
vides an official discussion of the reforms: “China’s
National Defense in a New Era,” Xinhua, July 24, 2019,
available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-
07/24/c_138253389.htm>.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 There are further details available upon request.
There are multiple references to this program in publicly
available information.
18 “The whole country's first national defense scientific
and technological innovation rapid response small group
launched in Shenzhen” [全国首个国防科技创新快速响应
小组在深圳启动], Shenzhen Special Zone Daily [深圳特
区报], available at March 18, 2018, <http://news.sina.com.
cn/c/nd/2018-03-18/doc-ifyskmpr7659375.shtml>
19 “Xi Jinping: Strive to Build a High-level Military
Scientific Research Institution to Provide Strong Support
for the Party’s Strong Military Objective in the New
Era” [习近平:努力建设高水平军事科研机构 为实现党
在新时代的强军目标提供有力支撑], Xinhua, May 16,
2018, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-
05/16/c_1122843283.htm>.
20 “China’s National Defense in the New Era.”
21 “Frontier” is my chosen rendering of qianyan (前
沿), which can also be rendered as “frontline,” “forward
position,” “cutting-edge,” or “advanced.”
22 “Academy of Military Science National Defense
Science and Technology Innovation Research Academy—
Exploring the “Matrix” Research Model to Enhance
Innovation Capability” [军事科学院国防科技创新研
究院—— 探索“矩阵式”科研模式提升创新能力],
April 2, 2018, available at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/
content/2018-04/02/content_202957.htm>. See also
“Academy of Military Science National Defense Science
and Technology Innovation Research Academy Has
Taken Measures to Gather Top Talents” [军科院国防
科技创新研究院多措并集聚顶尖人才], China Military
Network, February 4, 2018, available at <http://webcache.
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WDwIAWm-
c6agJ:www.81.cn/jwgz/2018-02/04/content_7931564.
htm+&cd=8&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>.
23 Yang Xuejun was the former commandant of the
National University of Defense Technology, and transfer
to lead AMS may reflect an elevation of AMS over NUDT.
24 This shift could indicate a closer integration of
medical science with military science. He Fuchu [贺福初],
“The Future Direction of the New Global Revolution in
Military Affairs” [世界新军事革命未来走向], Reference
News [参考消息], August 24, 2017, available at <https://
web.archive.org/web/20190823210313/http://www.xin-
huanet.com/politics/2017-08/24/c_129687890.htm>.
25 “‘Theory-Technology Fusion Innovation’ New Year
Seminar Successfully Convened in Beijing” [“理技融合
创新”新春座谈会在京成功召开], China Association for
Artificial Intelligence [中国人工智能学会], available at
<https://web.archive.org/web/20191011035737/http://caai.
cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/detail/id/490.html>.
26 The CMC S&TC’s expert group on biology and
cross-domain science and technology appears to guide
these projects, involving scientists with expertise in
neuroscience and biomaterials. The chief scientist of
the expert group on this topic has also highlighted the
military potential of technologies that include biosensing,
biomimetic information processing, and biocomputing to
enable new-type weapons and equipment.
27 Mu-ming Poo et al., “China Brain Project: Basic
Neuroscience, Brain Diseases, and Brain-Inspired
Computing,” Neuron 92, no. 3 (2016): 591–596.
28 Hu Dewen, “Military School Scratches ‘Cool
Smart Wind’” [军校刮起“炫酷智能风”], PLA Daily, July
19, 2019, available at <http://military.workercn.cn/328
20/201907/19/190719101538199.shtml>. Hu Dewen has
also received funding through National Key R&D Plan
to pursue research on human-robot intelligent fusion
technology. His research has included the use of neural
networks in adaptive control.
29 Chen Hanghui [陈航辉], “Artificial Intelligence:

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Disruptively Changing the Rules of the Game” [人工智
能:颠覆性改变“游戏规则], China Military Online,
March 18, 2016, available at <http://www.81.cn/jskj/2016-
03/18/content_6966873_2.htm>.
30 See, for instance, “Experts: Military
Intelligentization Is Not Merely Artificial Intelligence”
[专家:军事智能化绝不仅仅是人工智能], People’s Daily,
December 6, 2017, available at <http://military.people.
com.cn/n1/2017/1206/c1011-29689750.html>.
31 These directions in the Chinese military’s strategic
thinking are assessed to be relatively authoritative based
on the numerous articles and statements from high-level
military scientists and strategists. Certain Chinese mili-
tary scholars and scientists, including those affiliated with
the Academy of Military Science and National University
of Defense Technology, as well as several military medical
institutions, have articulated these lines of argument
across a range of books and articles that date back nearly a
decade. However, these theories and concepts are unlikely
to constitute official elements of doctrine at present.
32 He Fuchu, “The Future Direction of the New
Global Revolution in Military Affairs.”
33 Ibid.
34 Often, the PLA starts to explore a high-level con-
cept for which the meeting continues to evolve over time.
At present, there is no official or doctrinal definition for
these concepts, but I understand them as each referring
to attempts to achieve an advantage in the domains of
cognition, biology, and intelligence on the battlefield and
in overall military competition. Often, such concepts
originate the work in a prominent researcher but then
become the subject of more general debate and might be
eventually introduced into official planning and/or doc-
trinal materials.
35 For one perspective on the issues, see Dean Cheng,
“Winning without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological
Warfare Challenge,” Science 4 (2003): 30.
36 The Science of (Military) Strategy released in 2017
by the PLA’s National Defense University has added a new
section on “military competition in the domain of (arti-
ficial) intelligence” (智能领域军事竞争), in an unusual,
off-cycle revision of this authoritative textbook, of which
Lt. Gen. Xiao Tianliang (肖天亮), who remains the vice
commandant of the PLA’s National Defense University, is
the editor.
37 Yun Guangrong [游光荣], “AI Will Deeply Change
the Face of Warfare” [人工智能将深刻改变战争面], PLA
Daily, October 17, 2018, available at <http://www.81.cn/
jfjbmap/content/2018-10/17/content_218050.htm>.
38 Li Minghai (李明海), “Where Is the
Winning Mechanism of Intelligent Warfare?” [智
能化战争的制胜机理变在哪里? ], January 13, 2019,
available at <http://webcache.googleusercontent.
com/search?q=cache:2HxhOYXd2p0J:www.sohu.
com/a/288730322_778557+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=-
clnk&gl=us>. Li Minghai is a researcher with the PLA’s
National University of Defense Technology. Chen
Yongyi [陈永义], “Focus on Confronting ‘Counter-
intelligentization’ Operations” [重视应对“逆智能化”
作战], PLA Daily, August 1, 2019, available at <http://
www.81.cn/bqtd/2019-08/01/content_9575539.htm>.
39 Yuan Yi [袁艺], Gao Dongming [高冬明], and
Zhang Yujun [ 张玉军], “Also Discussing Intelligentized
Command ‘Autonomous Decision-Making’” [也谈智能
化指挥“自主决策”], PLA Daily, April 18, 2019, available
at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-04/18/con-
tent_231979.htm>.
40 CMC Joint Staff Department [中央军委联合参谋
部], “Accelerate the Construction of a Joint Operations
Command System with Our Military’s Characteristics”
[加快构建具有我军特色的联合作战指挥体系], Seeking
Truth, August 15, 2016, available at <http://www.qstheory.
cn/dukan/qs/2016-08/15/c_1119374690.htm.
41 Yuan, Gao, and Zhang, “Also Discussing
Intelligentized Command ‘Autonomous
Decision-Making.’”
42 Shen Shoulin [沈寿林] and Zhang Guoning [张
国宁], “Understanding Intelligentized Operations” [认
识智能化作战], PLA Daily, March 1, 2018, available at
<http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-03/01/con-
tent_200671.htm>.
43 Ibid; “Academician He You: Accelerate the
Development of Maritime Information Processing
Technology, and Provide Scientific and Technological
Support for a Powerful Maritime Nation” [何友院士:
加快发展海洋信息处理技术,为海洋强国提供科技支
撑], S&T Herald [科技导报], November 2017, available
at <http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-
KJDB201720001.htm, available in full text: https://web.
archive.org/web/20191011051014/http://blog.sciencenet.
cn/blog-336909-1084316.html>.
44 Zhang Xiao-hai [张晓海] and Cao Xin-wen [操新
文], “Military Intelligent Decision Support Systems Based
on Deep Learning” [基于深度学习的军事智能决策支
持系统], Command Control & Simulation [指挥控制与
仿真] 40, no. 2 (April 2018). The PLA has been inspired
by AlphaGo and AlphaZero in exploring such options,
and an initial proof of concept has been demonstrated
through “Prophet 1.0” (先知V1), an AI system devel-
oped by the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of
Automation that was used in wargaming.
45 Ibid.; “Academy of Military Medical Sciences
Researcher Wu Haitao Explains to You ‘What Will Brain
Science Bring from the Military’” [军事科学院军事医学

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研究院研究员吴海涛为您讲述——脑科学“从军”会带
来什么?], available at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/con-
tent/2019-04/26/content_232600.htm>.
46 Chen Jian-hua [陈建华] et al., “Multi-modal
Interaction Technology of Military Command and
Control System” [军事指控系统多通道人机交互技术],
Command Control & Simulation [指挥控制与仿真] 41,
no. 4 (August 2019).
47 For context, see Amanda M. Kelley et al.,
“Cognition Enhancement by Modafinil: A Meta-
analysis,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine
83, no. 7 (2012): 685–690; Wang Shizhong [王世忠]
and Hao Zhengjiang [郝政疆], “Brain Confrontation:
Achieving a High Degree of Integration between Humans
and Weapons” [脑对抗:人与武器实现高度融合], avail-
able at <https://web.archive.org/web/20190903022447/
http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-01/25/con-
tent_226145.htm>.
48 There are several potential alternative trans-
lations to zhinaoquan, including “mind/mental
dominance,” “mind/mental superiority,” and “cogni-
tive superiority.” The concept alludes to the superiority
in reasoning and decisionmaking that is required to
succeed on the battlefield. For the book that coined
this term most prominently, see Zeng Huafeng [曾华
锋] and Shi Haiming [石海明], Mental Dominance:
The Laws of War in the Global Media Age and National
Security Strategy [制脑权:全球媒体时代的战争法则
与国家安全战略] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army
Press, 2014). See also: Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga,
“Cognitive Domain Operations: The PLA’s New Holistic
Concept for Influence Operations,” China Brief 19,
no. 16, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/
cognitive-domain-operations-the-plas-new-holistic-con-
cept-for-influence-operations/>.
49 Zhu Xueling [朱雪玲] and Zeng Huafeng [曾华
锋], “Mental Control Operations: New Model of Future
Wars” [“制脑作战:未来战争竞争新模式”], PLA Daily,
October 17, 2017, available at <https://web.archive.org/
web/20191011053447/http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/con-
tent/2017-10/17/content_189879.htm>; Luo Yuzhen
[罗语嫣] et al., “The Common Domain Characteristics
of Cognitive Domain and Its Key Techniques” [认知域
的公域特性及其关键技术], National Defense Science &
Technology [国防科技] 39, no. 4 (2018).
50 Zhu and Zeng, “Mental Control Operations: New
Model of Future Wars.”
51 “Setting off a new revolution in military affairs?
Six key words to interpret intelligentized operations”
[掀起新的军事革命?六大关键词解读智能化作战], PLA
Daily, March 1, 2018, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.
com/mil/2018-03/01/c_129819887.htm>
52 Wang Zhaowen [王照稳] and Fu Minghua [
付明华], “Analysis of Cognitive Domain Warfare in
Informatized Warfare” [信息化战争认知域作战探析],
PLA Daily, July 28, 2015, available at <http://www.81.
cn/jmywyl/2015-07/28/content_6602887.htm>; Shi
Haiming [石海明] and Zeng Huafeng [曾华锋], “National
Cognitive Space Security Strategy from the Perspective
of Science and Technology and War” [科技与战争视角下
的国家认知空间安全战略], National Defense Science and
Technology [国防科技], no. 3 (2014), available at <http://
www.cqvip.com/qk/96765a/201403/661703248.html>. The
authors are affiliated with the PLA’s National University
of Defense Technology.
53 Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], ed., The Science of
Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: National Defense
University Press [国防大学出版社], 2017). The PLA
initially concentrated on space and cyberspace as new
strategic frontiers of military power. Increasingly, biology
and intelligent confrontation have been recognized as
new domains of military struggle in which the Chinese
military, as a latecomer is seeking to catch up with a pow-
erful adversary.
54 LI Bicheng [李弼程], HU Huaping; [胡华平], and
XIONG Yao [熊尧], “Intelligent agent model for network
public opinion guidance” [网络舆情引导智能代理模型],
National Defense Technology [国防科技], no. 3, (2019).
55 Lan Zhouda [兰舟达] and Ma Jianguang [马建光], “A
New Type of Cyber Warfare from the Perspective of Mental
Dominance—Taking the Color Revolution as an Example”
[制脑权视野下的新型网络战—以颜色革命为例], National
Defense Science and Technology[国防科技] 36, no. 2 (2015):
57–62, available at <http://gfkjjournal.nudt.edu.cn/ch/
reader/view_abstract.aspx?file_no=20150212&flag=1>.
56 Luo Xu [罗旭], Wu Hao [吴昊], and Guo Ji-wei
[郭继卫], “Research on a Systematic Framework for Brain
Science Military Applications for New-Type Combat
Forces Construction Strategy” [论新型作战力量战略下的
脑科学军事应用体系构成研究], Military Medicine [军事
医学] 11 (2015): 863–867.
57 “‘Brain Plan’ Opens ‘Mental Dominance’ into a
New Highland for Future Military Contests” [“脑计划”
开启 “制脑权”成未来军事较量新的高地], PLA Daily,
October 20, 2016, available at <http://military.people.com.
cn/n1/2016/1020/c1011-28793350.html>.
58 See, for instance Shen and Zhang, “Understanding
Intelligentized Operations.”
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 See “Brain Science Sociology and Brain-Computer
Interface Technology Series Academic Report” [“脑科学
与脑机接口技术”系列学术报告], May 15, 2019.
62 Since the PLA reforms, this team is now included

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under NUDT’s Institute for Intelligent Science and
Technology; “‘Brain-Machine Interface’ Technology:
Making ‘Brain Control’ a Reality” [“脑机接口”技术:
让“脑控”成为现实], China Military Online, May 21,
2015, available at <http://www.mod.gov.cn/wqzb/2015-
05/21/content_4586049_2.htm>.
63 His research on the theme of “brain networking
and brain-computer interaction” has been awarded, and
his influence appears to have deeply shaped the field: see
“Military School Scratches ‘Cool Smart Wind.’”
64 “‘Brain Plan’ Opens ‘Mental Dominance’ into a
New Highland for Future Military Contests.”
65 “‘Brain-Machine Interface’ Technology Coming
from the Laboratory into Real Life” [“脑机接口”技术
正从实验室走进现实生活], available at <http://www.
stdaily.com/cxzg80/guonei/2017-12/28/content_614787.
shtml>. See also:http://www2.scut.edu.cn/bci/2018/0910/
c18577a284388/page.htm>.
66 “Human-Machine Cooperation Entering
Actual Combat Intelligentization or Starting from the
Laboratory” [人机协同投入实战 智能化战争或从实验室
打响], S&T Daily, June 26, 2019.
67 “The Ministry of Education Convened a Press
Conference to Interpret the Artificial Intelligence
Innovation Action Plan for Colleges and Universities,
etc.” [教育部举行新闻发布会解读《高等学校人工智能创
新行动计划》等], Ministry of Education website, June 8,
2018, available at <http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-06/08/
content_5297021.htm#2>.
68 “Special Action Plan for Military-Civil Fusion
in the Domain of Intelligent Science and Technology
in Tianjin” [天津市智能科技领域军民融合专项行动计
划], August 9, 2018, available at <https://web.archive.
org/web/20190918010942/http://gyxxh.tj.gov.cn/
zhencwj/65062.htm>.
69 China Aerospace Science and Technology
Corporation (CASC),“Tianjin University ‘Intelligence’
Helps China Aerospace” [天大“智”造助力中国航天],
March 23, 2018, available at <http://news.tju.edu.cn/
info/1003/22110.htm>.
70 “State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience
and Learning Held the 2018 Academic Committee
Meeting” [认知神经科学与学习国家重点实验室召开2018
年学术委员会会议], January 16, 2019, available at <http://
brain.bnu.edu.cn/cn/tza/2019/0116/1424.html>.
71 2019 World Robotics Conference BCI Brain-Control
Robotics Competition and Third China Brain-Machine
Interface Competition [2019世界机器人大赛—BCI
脑控机器人大赛暨第三届中国脑机接口大赛], World
Robotics Conference, available at <https://web.archive.org/
web/20191011041722/http://2018.worldrobotconference.
com/uploads/file/20181224/15456436152616.pdf>.
72 See, for instance, comments from Cogrowth
founder and CEO Hua Zhongling, available at <http://
www.naokexue.com.cn/news/gs/187.html>.
73 “China Unveils Brain-Computer Interface Chip,”
Xinhua, May 18, 2019, available at <http://www.xin-
huanet.com/english/2019-05/18/c_138069590.htm>.
74 “Brain-Computer Interface and Intelligent Control
and First Brain Science Seminar Held” [脑机接口与智能
控制暨首届脑科学研讨会举行], Economics Daily [经济
日报], December 25, 2017, available at <http://www.ce.cn/
cysc/yy/hydt/201712/25/t20171225_27421101.shtml>.
75 Ibid. According to its designer, “Brain-Computer
Interfaces hold a promising future. The Brain Talker chip
advances BCI technology allowing it to become more por-
table, wearable, and accessible to the general public.”
76 Ibid.
77 “Shape the ‘Combat Brain’ for the Future—How
Far Is ‘Brain Networking’ from Us?” [为未来塑造“作战大
脑” “脑联网”离我们有多远?], PLA Daily [解放军报],
December 22, 2017, available at <https://www.chinanews.
com/cj/2017/12-22/8406674.shtml>.
78 “Academy of Military Medical Sciences Researcher
Wu Haitao Explains to You ‘What Will Brain Science
Bring from the Military’” [军事科学院军事医学研究
院研究员吴海涛为您讲述——脑科学“从军”会带来
什么?], available at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/con-
tent/2019-04/26/content_232600.htm>.
79 Yipeng Yu et al., “Intelligence-Augmented Rat
Cyborgs in Maze Solving,” PloS One 11, no. 2 (2016):
e0147754.
80 The Chinese government’s decision to prioritize
brain science can be traced back to the National Medium-
and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology
Development (2006–2020), which had emphasized the
importance of strengthening the study of the relation-
ships among brain development, plasticity, and human
intelligence. At the time, this initiative constituted one of
the “Major Science and Technology Projects Concerning
China's Future Development” (事关我国未来发展的重
大科技项目). Through the 13th Five-Year Science and
Innovation Plan, there were megaprojects launched in
brain science and brain-inspired intelligence, as well
as artificial intelligence for the 2016–2030 timeframe.
See “National Medium and Long Term Science and
Technology Development Plan Outline” (2006–2020) [国
家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要], Ministry of Science
and Technology, February 9, 2006, available at <http://
www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/200811/
t20081129_65774_9. Htm>. See also “Our Nation
Launched Four Major Science Research Programs” [我
国启动四项重大科学研究计划], Science and Technology
Daily, November 16, 2006.

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81 “Notice of the State Council on the Printing and
Distribution of the Thirteenth Five-Year National Science
and Technology Innovation Plan” [国务院关于印发“十
三五”国家科技创新规划的通知], State Council, August
8, 2016, available at <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/con-
tent/2016-08/08/ content_5098072.htm>.
82 Starting in 2013, the Chinese government had
decided to launch the “China Brain Project” (中国脑计
划), but its actual launch was not formalized until 2016,
and the development of a plan for its implementation
seems to have been further delayed. However, there have
been initial research programs and laboratories launched
in Beijing and Shanghai that are intended to advance this
agenda.
83 “Neurobiologist Pu Muming: How Brain Science
Helps AI Technology Research” [神经生物学家蒲慕
明:脑科学如何助力AI技术研究], Netease Intelligence [
网易智能], April 27, 2018, available at <http://tech.163.
com/18/0427/12/DGD9O89000098IEO.html>.
84 The emphasis on hybrid intelligence is not merely
a concept but also a priority in the New Generation
Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, released in July
2017, which emphasized China’s intention to pursue sig-
nificant breakthroughs in hybrid enhanced intelligence
and human-machine interaction: “Research hybridization
and convergence where “the human is in the loop,” behav-
ioral strengthening through human-machine intelligent
symbiosis and brain-machine coordination, intuitive
machine reasoning and causal models, associative recall
models and knowledge evolution methods, complex data
and task blended and enhanced intelligence learning
methods, cloud robotics coordination computing meth-
ods, and situational comprehension and human-machine
group coordination in real-world environments.”
85 See “Beijing Brain Science Research Is Constantly
Turning Research Results into Reality” [北京脑科
学研究正不断将研究成果转化成现实], January 12,
2016, available at <http://news.sciencenet.cn/html-
news/2016/1/335972.shtm>. This initiative involves
units that include the Chinese Academy of Sciences
Institute of Automation and the Academy of Military
Medical Sciences, as well as Peking University and
Tsinghua University. For further information, see
“Beijing Brain Science and Brain-like Research Center
Postdoctoral Science and Research Work Station 2019
Application Announcement [北京脑科学与类脑研
究中心博士后科研工作站2019年招聘启事], avail-
able at <http://www.chinapostdoctor.org.cn/content/
details20_690.html>; “Beijing Launches Pioneering
Brain Science Center,” Scientific American, 2016, avail-
able at <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
beijing-launches-pioneering-brain-science-center/>.
86 “Thirteenth Five-Year Science and Technology
Military-Civil Fusion Development Special Plan” (Full
Text) [“十三五”科技军民融合发展专项规划》全文],
available at <http://www.aisixiang.com/data/106161.html>.
87 Jing Pei et al., “Towards Artificial General
Intelligence with Hybrid Tianjic Chip Architecture,”
Nature 572, no. 7767 (2019): 106. Of course, it remains
to be seen whether these brain-inspired approaches to
artificial intelligence prove to be a promising archi-
tecture. According to the researchers, “The brain-like
intelligence inspired by the operating mechanism and
cognitive behavior can make up for the limitations and
shortcomings of current data intelligence. More critically,
brain-like intelligence will subvert the traditional com-
puter operating architecture, achieve a new computing
and storage integration model, and is expected to achieve
ultra-low power consumption.”
88 “Xiangshan Science Conference on ‘Non-human
Primate Brains and Cognition’ Held” [香山科学会议“非
人灵长类脑与认知”召开].
89 See, for instance, “Where Is the Winning
Mechanism of Intelligent Warfare?” [智能化战争
的制胜机理变在哪里], PLA Daily, January 15, 2019,
available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2019-
01/15/c_1210038327.htm>.
90 Although this program has not been officially
disclosed or announced, available references to it provide
robust indications that this project is underway.
91 Ibid.
92 “Brain Region Linked to Altered Social
Interactions in Autism Model,” McGovern Institute for
Brain Research, July 29, 2019, available at <https://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/07/190729094551.htm>.
93 Ibid.
94 Feng Zhengzhi [冯正直] and Zhang Rui [张 睿],
“Progress in Military Cognitive Neuroscience” [军事认
知神经科学研究进展], PhD diss., 2013. The authors are
affiliated with the Department of Behavioral Medicine,
College of Psychology, Third Military Medical University.
95 The original article is no longer readily avail-
able, but see a reference to the <https://webcache.
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:-Ih4uFfS-
RXwJ:https://www.shobserver.com/wx/detail.
do%3Fid%3D86079+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>.
96 Mu-ming Poo et al., “China Brain Project.”
97 Ibid. This massive scaling up of capacity for pri-
mate research nationwide with robust state support could
provide a potential advantage relative to the United States
and Europe. In China, researchers can benefit from the
ease, low cost, and speed of research without attendant
controversies.
98 “Xiangshan Science Conference on ‘Non-human

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Primate Brains and Cognition’ Held.”
99 For instance, researchers at the Academy of
Military Medical Sciences are using macaques to examine
techniques for brain-machine interfaces that involve the
implantation of electrodes in the brain.
100 Antonio Regalado, “Chinese Scientists Have
Put Human Brain Genes in Monkeys—And Yes, They
May Be Smarter,” MIT Technology Review, April 10,
2019, available at <https://www.technologyreview.
com/s/613277/chinese-scientists-have-put-human-brain-
genes-in-monkeysand-yes-they-may-be-smarter/>;
Sigal Samuel, “Scientists Added Human Brain
Genes to Monkeys. Yes, It’s as Scary as it sounds,”
Vox, April 12, 2019, available at <https://www.
vox.com/future-perfect/2019/4/12/18306867/
china-genetics-monkey-brain-intelligence>.
101 Lei Shi et al., “Transgenic rhesus Monkeys
Carrying the Human MCPH1 Gene Copies Show
Human-like Neoteny of Brain Development,” National
Science Review 6, no. 3 (2019): 480–493.
102 “Scientists Are Making Human-Monkey Hybrids
in China,” MIT Technology Review, August 1, 2019, avail-
able at <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614052/
scientists-are-making-human-monkey-hybrids-in-
china/>.
103 See Manuel Ansede, “Científicos españoles crean
quimeras de humano y mono en China,” July 30, 2019,
available at <https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/07/30/cien-
cia/1564512111_936966.html>.
104 Hao Wang et al., “CRISPR/Cas9 System: An
Important Tool for Brain and Cognitive Science,” Progress
in Biochemistry and Biophysics 44, no. 9 (2017): 799–805,
available at <http://www.pibb.ac.cn/pibbcn/ch/reader/cre-
ate_pdf.aspx?file_no=20170237>.
105 For an earlier collaborative analysis on the topic,
see Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military
Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and
the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” China Brief 19,
no. 18, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/
chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fu-
sion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/>.
106 See Guo Jiwei (郭继卫), War for Biological
Dominance (制生权战争) (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2010).
107 Li Hong-jun and Guo Ji-wei, “Evolution of Forms
of Warfare Promoted by Modern Biotechnology” [现代生
物科技推动战争形态演变的思考]. The authors are affil-
iated with the Southwest Hospital of the Third Military
Medical University.
108 Lou Tie-zhu [楼铁柱], “Review and the Outlook
for Military Applications of Synthetic Biology” [合成生
物学发展回顾与军事应用前景展望], Institute of Health
Service and Medical Information, Academy of Military
Medical Sciences.
109 Beyond outright military research, there is an
emerging ecosystem of academic and commercial enter-
prises that are or could become involved in supporting
military research. See “Thirteenth Five-Year Science and
Technology Military-Civil Fusion Development Special
Plan.”
110 Yi Biyi [易比一] et al., “Concept Research of
Zhishengquan” [制生权概念研究], Military Medical
Science [军事医学] 42, no. 1 (January 2018).
111 See Lu Peipei [陆倍倍] and He Fuchu [贺福初],
“Biological Science and Technology Will Become the
Strategic Commanding Heights of the Future Revolution
in Military Affairs” [生物科技将成为未来军事革命新
的战略制高点], PLA Daily, October 6, 2015, available at
<https://web.archive.org/web/20190813042422/http://
www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-10/06/content_6709533.htm>.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 He Fuchu, “The Future Direction of the New
Global Revolution in Military Affairs.”
115 Indeed, the phrasing is repeated more or less ver-
batim in this book by General (Ret.) Zhang Shibo (张仕
波), former commandant of the PLA’s National Defense
University Zhang Shibo [张仕波], The New High Ground
[新高地] (Beijing: National Defense University Press,
2017). I am indebted to Wilson VornDick for drawing this
book to my attention.
116 See, for instance: Zeng Huafeng [曾华锋] and
Shi Haiming [石海明], “Scientific and Technological
Deterrence: A New Trend in the Use of Military Power” [
科技威慑:军事力量运用的新趋势], February 17, 2019,
available at <http://www.sohu.com/a/295253193_358040,
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0204/c1003-
29804335.html>.
117 Fang [李芳] and Shi Haiming [石海明], “Biology
and Interdisciplinary Technologies” [生物交叉技术:
撬动生理信息战的前沿科技], Guangming Network,
Military Technology Frontier [军事科技前沿], October 19,
2016, available at <http://junshi.gmw.cn/2016-10/19/con-
tent_23026987.htm>.
118 Ibid.
119 That is, certain of these writings are vague, likely
deliberately, about whether their purpose is to raise con-
cerns that China could be subject to these kinds of attacks
or to highlight their offensive potential as a direction of
development that China should pursue going forward.
120 David Cyranoski, “Chinese Scientists to Pioneer
First Human CRISPR Trial,” Nature News 535, no. 7613
(2016): 476, available at <https://www.nature.com/articles/
nature.2016.20302>; Jon Cohen, “The CRISPR Animal
Kingdom,” Science, August 2, 2019, 426–429, available at

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<https://science.sciencemag.org/content/365/6452/426.
summary>.
121 Caixia Gao, “The Future of CRISPR Technologies
in Agriculture,” National Review of Molecular Cell Biology
19, no. 5 (2018): 275–276.
122 See, for instance, “Safety of Transplantation
of CRISPR CCR5 Modified CD34+ Cells in HIV-
infected Subjects with Hematological Malignances
(NCT03164135),” sponsored by Affiliated Hospital to
Academy of Military Medical Sciences, Study Evaluating
UCART019 in Patients with Relapsed or Refractory
CD19+ Leukemia and Lymphoma (NCT03166878),
Chinese PLA General Hospital.
123 Further details are available upon request.
124 Ibid. Further details are available upon request.
125 Michael Specter, “The Gene Factory,” The New
Yorker, December 29, 2013, available at <https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/06/the-gene-factory>.
126 For context, see John Bohannnon, “Why Are
Some People So Smart? The Answer Could Spawn
a Generation of Superbabies,” Wired, July 2013,
available at <https://www.wired.com/2013/07/genet-
ics-of-iq/>. Similarly, another company, Beijing Xinuo
Valley Biotechnology Co. Ltd., has cloned a number
of dogs as pets and for policing. “This Cloned Dog Is
Too Superior” [这只被克隆狗太优秀], Netease S&T,
August 22, 2019, available at <https://web.archive.org/
web/20190914070025/https://www.cnbeta.com/articles/
tech/881183.htm>.
127 Shen Bin et al., “Efficient Genome Modification
by CRISPR-Cas9 Nickase with Minimal Off-target
Effects,” Nature Methods 11, no. 4 (2014): 399.
128 For context, see BGI’s website and promotional
materials, available at <https://www.bgi.com/global/>.
129 See this great project from the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute: “China’s Tech Expansion,” available at
<https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/company/bgi>.
130 This claim was included in a news article that is
not entirely authoritative, but constitutes an interesting
characterization of that decision.
131 Emma Yasinki, “China Clamps Down on Foreign
Use of Chinese Genetic Material and Data,” The Scientist,
June 17, 2019, available at <https://www.the-scientist.com/
news-opinion/china-clamps-down-on-foreign-use-of-
chinese-genetic-material-and-data-66016>.
132 Cui Yingbo et al., “Review of CRISPR/Cas9
sgRNA Design Tools,” Interdisciplinary Sciences:
Computational Life Sciences 10, no. 2 (2018): 455–465.
133 Further details are available upon request.
134 Yang Xi et al., “An Interface for Biomedical
Big Data Processing on the Tianhe-2 Supercomputer,”
Molecules 22, no. 12 (2017): 2116.
135 Cui et al., “Review of CRISPR/Cas9 sgRNA
Design Tools.”
136 Mason Marks and Tiffany Li, “DNA Donors
Must Demand Stronger Protection for Genetic Privacy,”
StatNews, May 30, 2018, available at <https://www.stat-
news.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-genetic-privacy-nih/>.
137 James M. Sikela, “The Jewels of our Genome:
The Search for the Genomic Changes Underlying the
Evolutionarily Unique Capacities of the Human Brain,”
PLoS Genetics 2, no. 5 (2006): e80, available at <https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pgen.0020080>.