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Stupid Public Policies

and Other Political Myths

or

(Ten Stupid Things that Government Does that

Don’t Work and Waste Your Money and Why They do Them)

David Schultz, Professor

Graduate School of Management

507 Asbury Street, Suite 305

Saint Paul, Minnesota 55105

651.523.2858

dschultz@hamline.edu

December 18, 2008

Paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Annual

Convention, Chicago, Illinois. August 29 - September 2, 2007.

Abstract

American public policy is cloaked in many myths. Encompassing such issues as public

subsidies to sports stadia, enterprise zones, and welfare migration, there are many ideas recycled

from government to government over time with little thought given to the evidence supporting their

empirical assumptions or their prospects for success. In light of the Obama administration’s plans

to develop an economic stimulus package for states to implement, this paper looks ten policy myths

and bad ideas. The argument is that before states spend money they need to be more attentive to

what social science research says regarding what types of programs are effective.

Introduction

President elect Barack Obama’s plan to spend $700 billion or more to stimulate the

American economy raises a host of interesting question about how to spend that money in order to

achieve the proverbial “biggest bang for the biggest buck.” In contemplating this stimulus plan for

the economy significant talk has centered on perhaps giving this money to states for them to spend

on “shovel ready” projects that could potentially generate up to 2.5 million jobs. But the spending

of this money and giving authority to the states to decide which projects to spend them on raises two

questions. First, how good are states in spending money to encourage economic development or

engaging in good policy making? Second, are some types of projects better than others to help the

economy?

States often are viewed favorably as innovators in public policy. Justice Louis Brandeis’

famous and often repeated quote in New State Ice Company v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932),

described states as laboratories of democracy where “a single courageous state may, if its citizens

choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest

of the country.” Similarly, Carl E. Van Horn, in lauding the perceived [re]newed capacity of states

to innovate and experiment in public policy, asserts that: “Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first

century, state governments are at the cutting edge of political and public policy reform” (VanHorn

2006: 1). In an era when devolution and federalism are the buzzwords among some policy makers,

and at a time when others views lawmakers in Washington as hopelessly deadlocked in partisan

battles, it is no surprise that the attention has shifted back to states to drive the policy process.

Yet while states by default or design may be forced to drive policy making, questions about

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their capacity to innovate and implement are still open to debate. In particular, even though Elazar

(1984) has asserted that states have different political and legal cultures that affect how their

institutions are set up and operate, and Putnam (2000) has argued that the levels of social capital

across the country demonstrate contrasting capacity perform, one can still question whether states

truly are the laboratories of democracy that Brandeis waxed over.

When states make policy, the reality may demonstrate more often than not that they are less

laboratories of democracy and more factories of replication. For example, many state legislatures

are not professional or full time, or they lack extensive research staff to undertake policy work

(Rosenthal 1998). The reality may be that often the practice one state adopts when seeking to make

policy is to ask if another has already enacted it. If so, often that policy becomes adopted subject to

minor modifications. Additionally, states may find out about legislation at conferences, such as the

National Council of State Legislatures, where they hear about or see programs that have been

adopted elsewhere. The point here is that states may be creatures of “me tooism,” repeating and

replicating policy initiatives found in other states, often adopting them without asking if in fact they

work. One of the darker or unfortunate sides to this policy replication is that ideas adopted in one

state that do not work might also be adopted elsewhere, only to reproduce policy failures across

boarders.

This paper examines state and local governments borrowing ideas from one another,

producing what shall be called “stupid public policy.” American public policy is cloaked in many

myths. Encompassing such issues as public subsidies to sports stadia, enterprise zones, and welfare

migration, there are many ideas recycled from government to government over time with little

thought given to the evidence supporting their empirical assumptions or their prospects for success.

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Like bad meals that repeat on a diner, or a vampire who never dies, these ideas too are recycled and

never seem to go away. This paper examines several of the leading ideas and myths dominating

American policy making, exploring the reasons for their repetition and the evidence for their failures.

The real question raised here is simple: Why do governments consistently enact policies and laws

that have already been shown to be failures?

II.

The Patterns of Policy Process

“‘Innovation’ [is] an idea perceived as new by an individual” (Gray. 1973, 1174). Yet

however much Brandeis’ laboratories of democracy image is invoked, seldom has policy innovation

and genesis been studied, at least from the point of view of examining the role that imitation takes

on. Instead, a host of related issues are generally explored. Additionally, the genesis and

perpetuation of bad policy ideas is not an object of inquiry in policy studies.

One set of literature explores the agenda setting process and how ideas surface, and foment.

John Kingdon’s Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (1995) seeks to explain why specific

policy ideas make on to the agenda. He argues that one needs to look to policy windows and

entrepreneurs where three streams—problem, policy, and politics—convergence. Specifically, while

many worthy ideas might merit consideration and compete for space on the limited platform for

Congress or legislatures to consider, successful policy makers or entrepreneurs benefit from the luck

of a specific issue being perceived as a problem, a particular policy being seen as an appropriate to

it, and as political timing making consideration of the problem and policy salient.

Cobb and Elder (1972), like Kingdon, seek to understand why some ideas are thrust on to the

policy agenda. They argue that triggering devices are critical to that occurring. For example,

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external events, such as wars or new international conflicts can place items on the agenda. The

events of 9/11 placed terrorism on the national and local policy agendas, as did the launching of

Sputnik backing in 1957 place science and math on the education agenda. Triggering devises can

also be internal events. For example, the rise of AIDS as a health threat in the 1980s, or domestic

abuse in the 1970s as precipitated by the women’s movements of that decade, both fit this bill.

Anthony Downs (1972) looks at agenda setting and issue identification in yet another way,

seeing a pattern to how most policies are addressed. His issue attention cycle starts with a pre-

problem stage where a phenomena is not defined or seen as a problem. At some point an event,

perhaps a triggering device, as described by Cobb and Elder, leads to an alarmed discovery and

euphoric enthusiasm that a problem exists and that the government can in fact do something about

it. However, in stage three the public and policy lawmakers come to realize the cost of significant

progress, or see that addressing a problem, such as eradicating poverty, will not be quick, easy, and

cheap. As a result, there is a gradual decline in public interest in addressing the problem, and finally

the cycle moves into the post problem stage where almost like the hero in an old western, the policy

and issues surrounding it fade off in the sunset. Downs’ model, describing policies almost in

Warholian 15 minutes of fame logic, makes the five stages of the policy issue attention cycle feel

like Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’ (1973) five stages of dying—denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and

acceptance. Other writers, such as Jones (1977) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) also examine

agenda setting and the difficulty of getting ideas into legislative consideration.

Finally, while the policy literature often tries to explain why items make it on to the agenda,

Bachrach and Baratz (1962) became interested in explaining why some items are kept off it. Their

“Two Faces of Power” was a groundbreaking essay describing non-decision making. For Bachrach

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and Baratz, the ability to put or not put issues on the agenda is a powerful way to influence debate.

Moreover, non-decision making is still a form of policy making, especially if done repeatedly and

consistently over time, when done as a result of decisions by powerful interests or elites. For

example, the general lack of regulation of tobacco products, firearms, or significant reform in health

care delivery in the United States may perhaps be seen as the result of non-decision making at the

behest of the cigarette industry, the National Rife Association, and the private insurance lobby as

well as the American Medical Association, respectively. In parallel fashion Schattschneider’s (1960)

concept of the mobilization of bias in American politics is also supposed to explain why certain

issues of interest to one social economic strata are given consideration in American politics, whereas

others are not. In fact, the entire pluralist school and its critiques offers suggestions on how the

bargaining process among interest groups explains what issues appear or disappear from the policy

frontier (Truman 1971; Schattschneider 1960; Lowi 1969: Key 1969: McConnell1966; Dahl 1971;

Dahl 1976: Dahl 1979; Dahl 1989; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Ziegler 1964).

Finally, when it actually comes to evaluation and impact, there is a rich literature in the

policy analysis field. However, within this field, there is a significant debate over what role analysis

should have in the policy making process. On the one hand Wilson (1887) articulates the classic

politics-administration dichotomy, seeing in the former as the realm of values and the latter the world

of scientific rationality. There is a hint here that the two should not be joined, at least in the sense

that politics is about value production and thus not readily informed by the kind of research done by

administrators. Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s (1969) Maximum Feasible Misunderstandingis the most

clear statement on this point where he asserts: “The role of social science lies not in the formulation

of social policy, but in the measurement of its results” (193).

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Moynihan’s argument that the policy process is not driven by social science research is

indebted to the fact/value distinction articulated by David Hume (1980). However, others reject this

divorce, arguing instead that policy making should be social science-driven if the government is to

improve it performance and outcomes. Alice Rivlin’s (1973) Systematic Thinking for Social Action

is the classic book on this point, lamenting the ignorance about service delivery and arguing that we

ought to use federalism and random innovation to ascertain what policies work (86-90). Others such

as Tufte (1974), Rein (1976), and Lindblom and Cohen (1979) reach similar conclusions. For Rein

(1976: 254-260) there is an inextricable connection between how values structure facts and the latter

help us to understand the former. Lindblom and Cohen (1979: 16) see professional social inquiry

as providing knowledge for social problem solving. Finally, Tufte (1974) demonstrates how

empirical knowledge can facilitate policy choices.

What this latter group of writers seems to be hinting at is perhaps most closely related to the

issue or main theme of this paper. First, they split over whether and how social science research

should impact the policy making process. Second, they seem to hint at a gulf in the policy field. By

that, there are many policies that have been heavily and repeatedly researched by social scientists and

a significant amount of data are available either to indicate what works or not, or at least to help

frame the debate about certain issues. Yet in many cases, despite the social science research, elected

officials and policy makers tend to choices as if in denial. The debate, as magnified here, is much

like the debate over policy making or the budget; are they rational adventures or do they appeal to

emotions and politics.

Overall, while policy making, especially at the state level, shows a capacity to change and

innovate, the nature of that innovation is often understudied. Ignored is how much states act as

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copycats to replicate what has been done elsewhere, and also overlooked is how this type of policy

making is often done unreflectively, adopting proposals that have been tried elsewhere and failed.

Perhaps this is done either with ignorance of this fact or with the eternal hope of a Chicago Cubs

baseball fan that this time it will be different.

III. Stupid Public Policies and Political Myths

Stupid public policies and political myths often appear to capture the imagination of political

elites. By “stupid public policies” is it meant policies that are repeatedly proposed and which

continuously fail, even though there is social science research indicating that these policies would

not work. In addition, “political myths” refer to ideas which, like the proverbial urban folk legends

that seem to circulate everywhere, are often repeated or held up as true, even though there is no hard

evidence to support them or worse, data contradicting them. It is bad enough that one state or policy

making unit would fall prey to these policies or myths, but if states are less the laboratories of

democracy and more the factories of invention than thought, then these ideas may well replicate

themselves over and over, never to die the deaths they deserve.

Unfortunately there are too many stupid public policies and political myths to count,

necessitating an eventual book to catalog them. Yet this section of the paper seeks briefly to explore

ten of them. In an effort to provide guidance to a new president, Congress, and perhaps states as they

think about how to spend their money for a variety of public policy purposes, even beyond the

possible windfall from the Obama economy recovery plan, here are ten bad ideas that should be

avoided.

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1.

Tax incentives are needed to encourage business relocation decisions.

Perhaps at the top of any list of political myths is the idea that taxes, including their

incidences and incentives, are serious factors affecting business relocation decisions (Snell 1998).

At the core of this belief is the idea that businesses make decisions about where to locate a facility

based primarily or perhaps even exclusively upon taxes. As a result of this belief, state and local

governments have engaged in dramatic tax wars against one another in order to lure businesses to

their community. What do we really know about the impact of taxes upon business relocation

decisions?

The literature is clear—tax breaks to encourage economic relocation are economically

inefficient and wasteful. Hundreds of studies, including a bevy of them cataloged in State Tax

Notes, reach this conclusion (Anderson and Wassmer 2000; Bartik 1991; Bound, Jaeger, and Baker

1995; Fisher and Peters 1997). When businesses are surveyed regarding factors important to their

economic [re]location, taxes often come in way behind proximity to markets, suppliers, and the

quality of the labor force (Wasylenko 1997). None of this should come as a surprise. Each of these

other factors occupies a larger percentage of a business’s budget than do taxes, and all of them are

far more critical to the long term success of a business than are taxes. Moreover, when pressed,

businesses will actually admit this. For example, nearly 62% of those interviewed in a California

study on hiring tax credits indicated that they had never or rarely affected their decision to hire

individuals. In the same study, nearly half of those interviewed stated that tax incentives for

relocation did not affect their decisions (California Budget Project 2006; Hissong 2003). Overall,

the economic development literature states that general tax incentives and levels of taxation are not

major determinates of relocation, but instead might have some marginal influence when there is

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some tax elasticity and where the incidence is significant compared to other contiguous jurisdictions.

Even if the empirical data on relocation decisions was not enough to show the futility of

using tax incentives as an economic development tool, two additional arguments bode against it.

First is the concept of efficiency, second is the notion of opportunity costs. In terms of efficiency,

if in fact tax incentives are not major determinants of relocation, then awarding them pays entities

to do something they were already planning to do. In addition, in relocations, while one community

wins, another loses (especially if there is a closing and moving to another location). Subsidizing the

cost transforms what might have been a net zero impact in terms of economic costs into an overall

loss scenario. On top of all that, any money that perhaps should have been awarded to the losers to

make the relocation Kaldor-Hicks and Paraeto efficient is lost.

In terms of opportunity costs, communities contemplating tax subsidies should consider

whether it would be a better use of their money to give incentives to businesses or spend the money

another way if the goal is economic development. Public investments in education, infrastructure,

and worker productivity rank significantly higher in terms of encouraging economic development

and higher workers’ wages than do tax subsidies and incentives. Adam Smith, writing in his 1776

Wealth of Nations first pointed that out, and this remains a truism over 200 years later.

The bottom line: Tax subsidies and incentives for economic development do little to impact

business investment decisions.

2.

High taxes serve as deterrent to work or business activity.

A variant of the “taxes are important factors affecting location decisions argument” is the

claim that high taxes are deterrents to economic growth and that tax cuts will generally lead to

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investment decisions that produce, for example, jobs and new employment. Moreover, another

variation of this argument is that both individuals and entities have high elasticity when it comes to

taxes such that both flee from high to low tax jurisdictions.

For all of the same reasons that taxes are not a major factor in economic relocation decisions,

the same is true in terms of the impact of taxes on business or individual activity. While taxes may

have some minor impact alone in terms of marginal decisions to produce, the broader claim that they

impede serious economic growth is a vastly overblown claim that lies at the heart of supply side

economic theory. Again, as with business location decisions, taxes are a relatively minor factor in

the costs of production, falling far behind labor, transportation, supplies, and perhaps energy in terms

of issues impacting production. Moreover, often overlooked in studies of taxes is the net overall

impact of taxes minus services that individuals and entities receive in a jurisdiction. One needs to

undertake a complete calculation of what benefits are received from a jurisdiction minus the costs

in taxes. It is this overall package that perhaps more appropriately should be considered when

deciding what impact government taxes and spending has upon decisions to produce.

There are two additional arguments that can be marshaled in a discussion of taxes and

productivity. First there is the often used argument that if high taxes were the only factor affecting

production decisions, then states such as Minnesota, New York, Massachusetts, and California

would be economically dying whereas Mississippi and Alabama would be prosperous and wealthy

states because of their respective high and low tax incidences. However, the opposite is true,

suggesting other factors are also important in affecting business sand work decisions.

Second, if in fact high taxes are a deterrent to work, one would expect to see that reflected

in migration work patterns among commuters. Schultz (1998; 2000 b) studied the impact of state

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income taxes upon individuals who were tax commuters. Tax commuters are individuals who cross

state lines for the purposes of work. He found little evidence that the presence or absence of income

taxes, high or low income taxes, or even the presence or absence of special commuter taxes served

as a deterrent to individuals crossing state jurisdictions to work. While clearly these studies are not

the final word on the topic, they do suggest that other variables beyond the presence or absence of

income taxes serve as an impediment to work. In fact, assuming many individuals have a certain

amount of autonomy and choice to cross jurisdictions to work, they could have engaged in tax

avoidance behavior (beyond cheating!) by choosing not to commute.

Overall, while not denying that in some cases that taxes might serve to impact work in some

marginal cases, the broader claim that taxes alone discourage individual and entity production is a

vastly overblown assertion.

3.

Enterprise zones are an efficient means to encourage economic development.

Enterprise zones in the United States were developed as an economic development tool to

revitalize depressed areas that were lacking in investment or job production. More often than not

these areas were urban communities which, since the Model Cities programs of the 1960s, had been

the focus of redevelopment. These were communities which some scholars had seen as creating

cultures of poverty or were areas where work and jobs had disappeared. Unfortunately, Model Cities

did not work, or at least was perceived not to work or was abandoned by the President Nixon’s

administration, and instead replaced by the Community Development Block Grant Program and

Urban Development Assistance Grants. But by the 1980s even these programs were not viewed

favorably and during the Reagan Administration enterprise zones became a popular idea for

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economic development. These zones came to be seen as development tools not just for urban cores,

but for any depressed community needing an influx of capital investment.

Much of the logic of enterprise zones relies upon the assumptions of using tax abatements

as incentives for business relocations or development or to encourage employment decisions. But

in the case of enterprise zones, there is an identified geographic region which is deemed to be

economically disadvantaged or needing special help. Within this zone a state or local government

would provide financial incentives, such as abated or reduced income, property, sales, or other types

of taxes. These tax incentives, along with perhaps infrastructure assistance, are supposed to induce

businesses to relocate into the enterprise zone, and thereby bring with it jobs and all the benefits

associated with their move.

While elegant in theory, how have enterprise zones really worked? Bottom line, they are

generally a cost ineffective failure in encouraging economic development and in producing

meaningful employment opportunities. As summarized by Peters and Fischer (2003):

Enterprise zone incentive programs do not seem to provide enough benefit to firms

to materially alter their investment and locational habits; as a result, they do not

induce much, if any new growth. Moreover, although enterprise zones are justified

by politicians and academics alike as helping economically disadvantaged areas,

zones do not appear to provide much in the way of employment opportunities to zone

inhabitants. Furthermore, they tend to be very costly for government (128).

Enterprise zones thus suffer from three defects. First, the financial benefits are too little to induce

relocation decisions. Second, the jobs they produce are not meaningful or are too costly. Third, the

overall programs are costly. Add to these three a fourth criticism: Enterprise zones merely move

investment from one community to another at public expense, thereby creating no new economic

gains while at the same time subsidizing relocation decisions that probably would have already

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occurred.

In developing the criticism of enterprise zones their operational logic rests upon the same

premises as the overall strategy of using taxes as a drive to induce development or relocation. As

Bartik 1991; 1994) and Wasylenko (1997) and others have shown, taxes are far down on the list of

factors that influence economic location decisions. They are far less important that the quality of

the workforce, access to supplies and markets, and a host of other factors. Thus, for taxes to be a

major factor to induce relocation they would have to be of such magnitude and time far beyond what

any government offers.

Second the job production associated with enterprise zones is spotty at best. One study in

California found for example that nearly half of the business involved in a enterprise zone program

stated that the tax credits had little impact on their decisions to hire individuals (California Budget

Brief 2006). Even a 2001 HUD study on the federal Empowerment Zones and Enterprise

Communities Program could not substantiate that the job growth in these areas was statistically

better from the areas outside them during the hot economic binge of the 1990s. The quality and cost

of the jobs produced were also of concern in the report on these zones. Overall several studies, such

as by Boarnet and Bogart (11996), (Greenbaum 1989), Engberg (2000), and Bondonio and Engberg

(2000) reach similar conclusions that job and economic growth were not necessarily enhanced by

enterprise zones. Even beyond their use for enterprise zones, tax breaks often fail to create the

conditions for companies to hire individuals. For example, Berenson (2007) reported that even with

the billions of dollars in tax breaks given to drug companies, those incentives failed to yield the jobs

promised.

Third, as just noted, job production in enterprise zones seldom lives up to its hype.

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Surveying over 75 zones, Peters and Fischer (2003) found the average public subsidy per job to be

nearly $60,000 annually, with overall costs in the millions to induce one job. Hardly economically

efficient. Moreover, in terms of providing job opportunities to those living in the zones, often those

in those areas lack the requisite job skills, or those living outside the enterprise area take the job,

thereby again mitigating the impact of the government as a development and opportunity program.

Finally, if in fact other factors besides taxes are more important factors in influencing

relocation and hiring decisions, what is the real impact of providing the subsidy and encouraging a

move? Simply this is classic robbing Peter to pay Paul. Businesses and jobs are closed in one

community and are paid to relocate to another (that would have probably already occurred anyhow)

but this time at public expense or loss of tax revenue. Hence, any gains in one area are offset by

losses in another, unless one can assume that cluster development in the new area is so significant

that it offsets the losses in another community.

But yet another flaw in the enterprise zone concept is again related to the same problem

associated with building too many of any attraction, such as aquariums—one is novel but too many

floods the market and diminishes the uniqueness of them. If there is only one aquarium then it

enjoys a comparative advantage as a tourist attraction, but if many communities have them then the

unique attraction goes away. Many states have multiple enterprise zones. In Minnesota, JOBZ

places numerous zones across the state, competing against one another and non enterprise zone

communities. At one time in South Carolina, the entire state was declared an enterprise zone. At

some point the dilution of tax advantages from these programs negate one another, thereby rendering

them ineffective within the state and then across state lines.

Overall, while a nifty idea in theory, enterprise zones have been shown to be repeated failures

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in producing the promised benefits.

4.

Public subsidies for sports stadia are a good economic development tool.

Does it make sense for a city or community to fund the construction of a new sports stadium in

order to stimulate economic development? Listening to sports reporters, team owners, and many

elected officials, the answer is yes. Yet while it may be fun to root, root, root, for the old ball team ,

does it make economic sense for the public to provide tax dollars to pay, pay, pay to for new stadiums?

What are the facts and what do we know about the impact of sports stadia on economic development and

urban revitalization? The overwhelming evidence is that the public use of tax dollars for a sports

stadium is economically inefficient and a bad investment that produces no real net economic benefit to

a community. In short, giving money to building stadia is simply sportsfare—welfare for sports.

In general, as one surveys local debates about stadium construction in the United States,

three basic arguments are employed to support using public money to build sports stadia. First,

proponents claim that building a new stadium will have a big impact on the economy, generating

many new jobs and bringing new businesses to the area. However study after study has

demonstrated that advocates of public spending on stadia consistently exaggerate the benefits of

sports to a local economy.

A 1996 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, “Tax-Exempt Bonds and the

Economics of Professional Sports Stadiums” (Zimmerman 1996) concluded that sports stadia

represent a small percentage (generally less than 1%) of a local economy. It also stated that there

is little real impact or multiplier effect associated with building sports stadia. By that, if one looks

at the economic impact of the dollars invested in sports stadia, the return is significantly smaller than

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compared to other dollars invested in something else. Moreover, the building of stadia merely

transfers consumption from one area or one type of leisure activity to another, and that overall, sports

and stadia contribute little to the local economy and instead represent an investment that costs the

public a lot while failing to return the initial investment. Dollar for dollar, the opportunity costs of

investing in sports stadia is a terrible option if the goal is economic development, job development,

or producing new economic development in a community. In short, the nearly $3 billion in sports

subsidies it documented produced little, at the cost of over $120,000 per job.

Literally hundreds of other studies and books by individuals such as long-time sports

economists Arthur T. Johnson in Minor League Baseball and Economic Development (1995), Mark

Rosentraub in Major League Losers (1997), Kenneth Shropshire in The Sports Franchise Game

(1995), and Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist in Sports, Jobs, and Taxes (1997), and Michael N.

Danielson in Home Team (1997) reach the same conclusion—public support of professional and

minor league sports is a bad investment. In practically none of the cities these studies examined did

new sports stadia lead to any significant new private investment or provide for any significant

economic benefits to the local economy besides the jobs generated by the initial capital construction

of the stadia. More importantly, the new stadia generally were not even profitable or self-financing.

Nor could cities point to rising land prices or economic development in the surrounding community.

Even as tourist attractions, the stadia either simply transferred sales from somewhere else, failed to

demonstrate that the local hotels were filled as a result of the sports events (Ford 1003: 199).

Finally, in terms of the much ballyhooed job production, outside of initial construction and the

salaries for the players themselves, part time, seasonal, and no benefit beer and peanut sales jobs

were the fare for what the billions of public dollars produced.

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A second claim to support public investment in a stadium is that keeping a sports team is

necessary to ensure that one remains a first class city. Would the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and

St. Paul (which the State Legislature voted in 2006 to authorize a sales tax worth upwards of $300

million for a new stadium) or any city be any worse off by losing a sports team? Without a sports

team, most cities would still have parks, museums, zoos, arts facilities, good neighborhoods,

schools, and the general quality of life that separates first and second class cities from one another

and suburbs.

Moreover, if one accepts this logic of sports being necessary to make a city first class, can

we say that New York City became second class when the Giants and Dodgers fled for California

in the 1950s, or that Los Angeles became second class when it lost the Angels to Anaheim or the

Rams to Saint Louis? The answer is obviously no.

Professional sports are only one small piece of what makes a city first class. Moreover,

professional sports are also only a small part of the local entertainment puzzle with many consumers

often transferring their consumption to other forms of entertainment, including amateur sports, if pro

sports are not available. Similarly, sports are even a smaller piece of the local urban economic pie

such that its presence or absence is not significant in the face of other features in a thriving and

diverse urban area. In addition, with the cost of attending sports events so high, often approaching

or exceeding $200 per game for a family of four, many sporting events are no longer an affordable

family entertainment option. Instead, sports owners look to other corporate interests to buy tickets,

thereby making sports an aspect of a city’s first class status that is beyond the reach of most of its

residents.

Finally, advocates for a publicly-funded stadia say that such funding is necessary to maintain

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owner’s profits. The issue here is not profitability, but the level or amount of profits the owners

want. They want to make more money and who is to blame them for that desire. However, there

are a couple of different issues here. First, many owners say that larger stadia with more seats are

necessary if they are to make more money. To support that, owners often trot out attendance figures

to show declining profits.

Attendance figures tell only part of the story since they are only a small part of the revenue

stream for owners. Revenue from luxury sports boxes, corporate sponsorship and ads, television and

radio contracts, and promotions make up a far bigger and more profitable part of what owners

receive from their sports adventures. Yet even this money is not enough because owners often claim

they are not making as much money as other owners and thus, building a new stadium is a key to

upping their profits. Clearly the end result of this “keeping up with the Jones” logic is to constantly

push up the average profitability of all sports teams such that there will always be some teams below

the average demanding financial assistance.

Overall, while communities may choose to invest in sports facilities because of the cultural

amenities they offer, doing so for economic development reasons is another stupid public policy and

political myth that deserves to die.

5. The building of convention and other entertainment centers are successful tools for economic

development.

The 1989 baseball movie Field of Dreams is famously known for a voice echoing “If you

build it he will come.” While this line inspired legendary baseball player Shoeless Joe Jackson to

appear in a ball field in the middle of corn in Iowa, the quote was also supposed to be a mantra to

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encourage individuals to follow their dreams. However, this line has taken on an even bigger

meaning, capturing a theory of urban economic development that places an emphasis upon the

building of convention and entertainment centers as a spur to economic development. In the case

of the shooting of a Field of Dreams, Dyersville, Iowa, the ballfield has itself become an attraction

built or maintained with the hope that they (tourists) will come.

In the last two decades many cities have shifted their urban economic development strategies,

moving away from housing, office, or retail space construction meant to service its own citizens, to

approaches meant to woe tourists and conventioneers to their community (Sanders 2002). As

Eisinger (2000: 317) states, the basis of this shift is “Thus city leaders make entertainment projects

a keystone of their urban economic development strategy, hoping that they will generate ancillary

development, high employment multipliers in the hospitality and retail sectors, and local tax

revenues.” Or as Sanders well captures this “if you build it they will come” belief of local officials

when it comes to the building of convention space and centers: “[M]ore space will bring more

meetings and tradeshows, generating more attendees, dollars, and economic impact” (Sanders 2002:

206). But does this strategy work? Is the building of convention centers or entertainment facilities

to promote tourism alone going to be the silver bullet that revitalizes an urban core or area economy?

The simple answer is no.

There are many reasons why the convention-entertainment center/tourism strategy has been

unsuccessful. First, again as Sanders points out, the massive expansion of convention space in the

last 25 years—from 25 million square feet of space in 1980 to 53.7 million in 2001 to nearly 70

million in 2006 (Sanders 195)—was premised upon faulty studies and projections regarding the

demand for such type of space. All of these studies seemed to assume similarly sustained growth,

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economic impact, and promises that will flow from tourism. However, all these studies ignored

other issues, such as infrastructure costs and needs (such as for airports) to bring in tourism, or they

ignored how the competition from other communities also building similar facilities would drain

away demand. In short, Sanders pointed out that the tourism frenzy often relied upon untested

claims of development, with studies generally financed and commissioned by downtown tourism

bureaus that failed to provide a sound empirical grounding for their rosy projections. These studies,

as Sanders pints out, were almost verbatim repeated in city after city, ignored the dilution issues that

building multiple conventions centers around the nation would yield. They also ignored that some

cities, no matter what, may not simply be the draws for tourism, no matter how much they built.

A second and more fundamental reason behind the failure of the “if you build it” philosophy

is premised in the belief that a single factor makes an urban center economically viable. As both

Jane Jacobs pointed out in The Death and Life of Great American Cities (2002) and Larry Ford in

America’s New Downtowns (2003), cities depend upon a mix of factors to make them thrive,

including commercial, retail, housing, office, and other amenities. Jacobs argued that, in part, what

makes a city exciting and vibrant is encouraging a mixture of uses that bring people and purposes

together. Often times convention centers, built to look like big fortresses, wall off attendees from

the rest of the city (Ford 2003: 185). This precludes an integration of the center into the rest of a

city’s economy. The belief that a city can buy development is incorrect according to Jacobs (1985);

no single factor can spur revitalization, instead a cluster of factors are critical, including many of

those already discussed in terms of what makes an area ripe for business relocation and development.

Tracy (2005) examined the creation of the Orange County, Florida convention center,

concluding that it failed to have the economic impact predicted. In searching for answers, one

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conclusion was that while a lot of money passed through the community, much of it did not stay

in Orange County. Often times up to one-third of the conventioneers did not leave the center or stay

overnight, thereby mitigating their economic impact. Similarly, places like Niagara Falls receive 12-

14 million visitors per year, but despite that traffic, this New York city is only able to capture a small

percentage of these individuals and encourage them to spend money in their community. One

conclusion to explain al this is that while convention centers and tourist attractions produced a lot

of [economic] activity, this is different from economic development. Convention centers, just like

enterprise zones or baseball stadiums, shift leisure activities from one place or pursuit to another,

but they overall generally fail to produce the desired economic outputs because they are seldom used

continuously in the way other facilities are. In many cases, they are often vacant while awaiting the

next convention. Comparing the multiplier impact of a convention center against building an office

or housing which is continuously used, it is no surprise that the former fails to live up to its promises.

Finally, again for all of the reasons cited with regard to enterprise zones and baseball

stadiums, convention centers and tourism fail as economic development tools in that they assume

that the tax incentives to produce jobs are either cost effective, are real and new economic

development (and not shifts in consumption), or otherwise have better job multipliers or uses of land

than rival investments of public dollars (Eisinger 2000; Sanders 1998). Overall, while it might make

sense for some cities to pursue a convention center strategy, their effects are eroded when multiple

players simultaneously pursue this strategy.

6.

Welfare recipients migrate to state simply to seek higher benefits.

One policy legend centers on the welfare magnet thesis that contends that individuals on or

22

seeking public assistance migrate to states with the highest benefits. In Minnesota, a high--benefit

states, elected officials have reached a fever pitch at times in claiming that busloads of individuals

in Chicago monthly travel to their state to collect their welfare checks, only to return to Illinois for

the duration of the month. Moreover, the lure of the welfare migration thesis was so strong that in

1996 when the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act was passed, it contained in it a

provision allowing states to deny higher benefits to recent migrants to their state. While the Supreme

Court eventually invalided this provision, welfare reform in the states produced fears that the anxiety

over welfare migration would produce a benefits race to the bottom.

What is the reality of welfare migration? Simply stated, it has largely been discredited. For

example, the National Research Council found that few AFDC recipients moved between states, and

when they did do so, it was not a result of benefit levels (Welfare Law Center 1996: Citro and

Michael 1995). Instead, poor people and those on public assistance move from state to state largely

for the same reasons other people. By that, they generally follow overall immigration patterns,

moving to states where there are job opportunities, seeking to relocate for family reasons, or looking

to get a fresh start in life, just as all other Americans seek to do (Welfare Law Center 1996: Long

1980). Migration patterns in the 1980s and 1990s for example, demonstrated that the poor tracked

towards the sunbelt states the same as everyone else. These are the states that generally have lower

benefits than the high benefit ones in the midwest and northeast. Additional studies by Allard and

Danziger (1997), Hanson and Hartman 1994; Walker 1994; Levine and Zimmerman 1996; and Frey

1996) also largely discredit the welfare migration thesis as a significant factor affecting the decision

of the poor to migrate. While there are studies that counter the thesis, the latter largely ignore either

how small the migration impact is, how the movement of the poor tracks larger demographic shifts,

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or misunderstands or characterizes who the poor are and the resources they have to be mobile.

Perhaps the best series of studies in an attempt to document welfare migration and its costs

to the state is in Minnesota (typically a high benefit state, especially in comparison to contiguous

neighbors) where the state demographer and other offices have examined the issue. A 1987 State

Auditor study in Minnesota noted that in 1986 individuals on public assistance both entered and left

the state, leaving open questions about the net impact of welfare migration on the state. A 1994

Department of Planning report entitled “Welfare Migrants Add to Minnesota’s Rolls” the state found

that based on the 1990 census, four percent of all the migrants to the state were on welfare, costing

the state approximately $17 million dollars. These welfare migrants cost the state approximately

eight percent of its total public assistance budget. However, the report was unable to ascertain

whether the migrants were on public assistance prior to coming to Minnesota or whether their

moving to the state was based upon the welfare benefits or for other reasons such as family or job

opportunities.

Another report by the Legislative Auditor (2000) found that migration from other states had

in fact increased the state’s welfare load, although it could not conclude that individuals came to

Minnesota as a result the state’s benefits. Again the report noted that individuals on welfare also left

the state but that overall it cold not ascertain the net impact of migration. Nor could it, the report

noted, state clearly the reasons for the migration, but it did state that “welfare benefits are not the

primary reasons for migration by welfare families” (48). However, the overall impact of migration

on welfare benefits was small. Finally, a 2000 study by the state demographer, drawing upon census

data, also refuted the notion that welfare benefits were a major factor in migration decisions. In

short, , as the state demographer stated in comments to the researcher: “In any case, if we were a

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‘welfare Mecca,’ as we have been called, wouldn't the welfare roles reflect that with an

overwhelming number of recipients accumulated over the past nearly 4 decades?” In short, in

Minnesota at least, the evidence of welfare migration is negligible at best.

Perhaps the paradigms of the images of poor people migrating is located in John Steinbeck’s

Grapes of Wrath or in the 1960s television series The Beverly Hillbillies. In the former, Oakies

move from the dustbowl farms of Oklahoma to seek out the good life in California while in the latter

a fictional family moves to that state after striking it rich. Ignored in these depictions are two critical

issues. First, the Oakies who moved (and they were based on real accounts of migration during the

Depression) did so not for welfare benefits but to find jobs. In the case of Jed, Granny, Jethro, and

Ellie Mae, they migrated because they were rich and could afford to do so.

Much of the myth of welfare migration is premised upon several questionable assumptions.

First, it assumes that the poor are rational calculators who make cost/benefit life style decisions.

Second, it assumes they have knowledge about different welfare benefit levels. Third, the benefit

differences are enough to outweigh the costs of travel. Fourth, that these individuals have the

resources to migrate. All of these assumptions are questionable. In fact, one could assert that part

of what it means to be poor is that one is denied the access to the knowledge and resources to make

many of the choices others could make. Overall, the reality of migration is largely confirmed by The

Beverly Hillbillies—it is the more affluent who move and who are mobile.

7.

Three strikes laws and mandatory minimums are effective deterrents to crime.

Mandatory minimum penalties are a popular proposal for getting tough on crime. The idea

behind them is simple and it is rooted in deterrence theory: Simply increase the sentence for

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committing a crime and the idea is that the average calculating [would-be] criminal will do the math

and decide not to break the law. While the idea of mandatory minimums have been around for

awhile and in part are at the core of determinate sentencing philosophy since the 1980s, the 1990s

saw the birth of” three strikes and your out” laws.

Violent crime was on the rise in the early 1990s, even though the overall crime rate and

victimization was still lower than it had been several years before. However, the public rated crime

as a major problem, with large majorities supporting enhanced or increased sentences that made it

difficult for those convicted of a crime to be paroled. More important, penological research

indicated that repeat offenders were a major source of crime. By some estimates, "as few as 5

percent of all offenders may account for over half of all robberies and other violent crimes for gain"

(Sherman 1983). This research suggested that in many cases simple incarceration for a longer

period of time of some habitual criminals would reduce the number of crimes. In addition, there was

a growing belief that rehabilitation as a penological goal had failed (Wilson 1983). Increasing

recidivism rates, indicating that larger percentages of inmates were committing crimes and returning

to jail, again suggested that incarceration for longer periods of time, was a solution to the perceived

rising number of crimes and crime rates.

Tougher mandatory minimums were depicted as one way to deter criminals, yet there was

little evidence that such laws had much impact. For example, Franklin Zimring and Gordon

Hawkins' study of mandatory minimum laws found little impact in deterring crime (Zimring and

Hawkins 1995). Studies in Massachusetts, Michigan, Florida, New York, and elsewhere reached

similar conclusions Parent 1997). Good social science evidence was thus available to frame the

debates on three strikes to show that mandatory minimums and enhanced penalty laws had little

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impact on crime. However, while social scientists often like to believe that their research will have

policy import, it appears that sentencing studies had little impact on the three strikes debate.

In the early 1990s, a significant portion of public viewed crime as the most serious

noneconomic problem facing the country and demands to get tough on it were hardening (Gallup

1993; Gallup 1994). Both media accounts of crime on the local news that created the impression

of escalating violence on the streets and the use of the crime by politicians as an election issue fueled

this demand. In 1992, President Bush ran for reelection calling for the passage of three strikes laws,

while in1994 Governor Wilson in California rode to reelection on a get tough on crime platform

demanding the passage of a similar law. Finally, several high profile cases, such as the Polly Klass

murder by a released criminal in California, also drove the public demand to increase penalties and

adopt what would come to be known as three strikes legislation.

Thus, debates about tougher criminal sentences in 1993 came in the context that could be

called a frenzied emotional setting. Fears of crime and victimization were running high. Politicians

were appealing to this mood, and the media was increasing its coverage of violent crime rendering

the local news as no more than "crime, weather, and sports." Given this climate, three strikes laws

were passed by twenty-two states and the federal government between 1993 and 1995. Exactly what

offenses were counted as strikes rather than foul balls or how the laws in each case worked varied

significantly.

Did the three strikes law decrease crime? Not surprisingly, the answer is no. Both Zimring,

Hawkins, and Kamin (2001) and Schultz (2000) reached similar conclusions in that the three strike

laws had little deterrent effect and instead produced several unwanted externalities. Zimring,

Hawkins, and Kamin (2001) found little evidence of deterrence. For example, there was no evidence

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that those facing the three strikes laws were less deterred or committed less crimes than those not

facing the law. Similarly, this study and the Schultz (2000) noted that crime rates were already going

down before the three strikes laws went into effect. Additionally, their spotty use in most states

questions how much of an impact the laws had on crime rates. Further, comparing three strikes to

non three strikes states found no evidence that the former had crime rate decreases greater than the

latter. Overall, by all statistical measures, three strike laws did not seem to have much impact on

crime rates. Instead, natural down turns in crime as they recessed towards their historical norms, the

improvement of the economy, the 100,000 Clinton cops, or perhaps other factor could account for

the decreases in crime.

But three strike laws not only had no measurable impact on crime rates but they produced

several adverse impacts. For one, to pay for the three strikes laws, states had to increase significantly

their corrections budgets, often at the expense of education. This was the case in California where

the choice of teaching kids how to read or prisoners how to make license plates led to the latter being

better funded. Three strike laws also led to states incarcerating individuals for minor crimes or for

terms way in excessive of the safety treat posed by these individuals. Finally, three strikes laws led

to a potential generation of elderly inmates, replete with medical and health bills that came with

them.

Overall, while sounding like a good idea, three strikes laws strike out as an effective law

enforcement tool.

8.

Sex education causes teenagers to engage in sexual activity.

Venturing into social policy where moral and religious issues surface, one finds the

discussion of sex education to be a hotbed area of much political myth. The United States, like Great

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Britain, because of their traditionally conservative treatment of human sexuality, has had a history

of difficulty with legislation dealing with contraception and birth control. At the top of the list in

this area is controversy over the teaching of sex education in schools. Among the objections raised

is the assertion that the teaching of sex education, or about birth control, for example, will lead to

increased sexual curiosity and therefore activity among juveniles. Thus, if one wishes to decrease

sexual activity among minors, or at least sexually-transmitted diseases, then teaching about sex is

exactly the opposite policy that should be adopted. Instead, one should not discuss the issue. One

quick response often offered here is that minors are going to engage in sexual activity no matter

what, so one might as well tell them the way to do it safely. This response, however, ignores the

argument regarding the alleged link of sex ed to sexual activity.

Is there a linkage? Does sex education cause teenagers to engage in sexual activity? Of

course, causal claims are hard to substantiate, but even the evidence for correlations is refuted. In

general, scientific research has demonstrated that sex education for minors does not increase sexual

activity (Pleck 1992; Sulak 2006; Kirby 2002; Oettinger 1999 ; Baldo 1998; Furstenberg 1997;

Wellings1995; Wymelenberg 1990; Bearman and Bruckner (2001); Bruckner and Bearman (2005);

Dailard (2002); Kirby (2001); Satcher (2001)). More specifically, AIDs and sex education led to a

decrease sexual activity. (Pleck 1992). Increased in sexual knowledge resulted in a decrease and

delay in sexual activity (Sulak 2006). School-based clinics and school condom-availability programs

do not increase sexual activity (Kirby 2002; Edwards, Steinman, Arnold, & Hakanson, 1980; Kirby

et al., 1993; Kirby, Waszak & Ziegler, 1991; Kisker, Brown & Hill, 1994; Newcomer & Duggan,

1996; Zabin, Hirsh, Smith, Streett, & Hardy, 1986). A World Health Organization study found that

sex and AIDs education did not lead to sexual activity (Baldo 1998). Condom access did not lead

29

to increases in sexual activity (Furstenberg 1997), and sex education did not lead to an increase in

sexual activity or the lowering of the age for first sexual experience (Wellings1995). Overall, the

evidence is solid, refuting the claims that increased sexual knowledge increased sexual activity.

The discussion of sex education and minors here is meant to highlight what appears to be a

broader myth or error that many policy makers make. That is, often times legislation is debated or

discussed and the argument against or for it is something to the effect that “It will send the wrong

message to children.” Quite simply and for the most part, most adults have no idea what messages

are being heard by children and how they are being interpreted. As a result of Piaget and other

developmental psychologists, we know that children interpret and organize the world differently

from adults. What ever messages adults may think policies are sending is often mere conjecture.

Instead of guessing what message a teenager may be receiving, go ask one. . .or several! Perhaps

with the exception of adults at the cigarette and tobacco companies responsible for Joe Camel , few

©

probably understand what children are learning from adult messages. This suggests that unless one

is prepared to document from surveys or other empirical means what a specific message may meant

to children if they are listening, this objection to policy making needs to be banished.

9.

Immigration and immigrants take jobs away from Americans and serve as a drain on the

economy.

Immigration seems to be a perennially politically salient issue in the United States. While

there are numerous reasons surrounding its political volatility, two specific arguments are generally

levied against immigration. One criticism is that immigrants are a net drain on the economy;

specifically, they are a bigger drain on taxes and public services than they are overall contributors

30

to the economy. Second, immigrants are depicted as taking jobs away from Americans. What do

we know about both of these claims?

First, while acknowledging that immigrants may in some local settings or jurisdictions place

some short term significant burdens upon public services, overall they are net contributors to the

economy. Several studies substantiate this point. Most recently, the 2005 Economic Report of the

President provided a detailed analysis of the impact of immigration upon the United States economy.

In it the report noted they as a group they had up to a $10 billion net positive impact upon the

economy (Economic Report of the President 2005: 106-108). The report noted for example that

while immigrants may be more likely than native born Americans to be on public assistance, the “net

present value of immigrants’ estimated future tax payments exceeded the cost of services they were

expected to us by$80,000 for the average immigrant and his or her descendants” (107). However,

with changes in public assistance laws, that figure had been upped to $88,000 (107). Yet this figure

masks the fact that better educated immigrants (highschool degree or better) definitely display this

positive figure, but even among those not as well educated, the gains from their and their

descendants’ productivity nearly if not totally offset the costs they impose upon public services that

accrue to state and local governments. Finally, the president’s report also provided other

documentation regarding the impact of immigrants upon the economy. For example, it noted that

immigrants paid Social Security taxes on income of $463 billion dollars (108).Moreover, because

illegal immigrants cannot collect Social Security, it is likely that immigrants overall pay more into

this government program than they receive from it.

In addition to the President’s 2005 report, other studies have noted the net economic benefit

of immigrants to the United States. A 1997 National Academy of Sciences study found several net

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benefits associated with immigration, including being the originator of the analysis showing up to

the $10 billion net benefit to the economy. Edmondson (1996) found that: “Illegal aliens in prison

cost about $471 million a year, and they consume about $445 million more in Medicaid funds. But

these costs are offset by about $1.9 billion in taxes paid by illegals and billions more in consumer

spending.” Furthermore, the National Academy of Sciences, President’s Report, and the

Edmondson study, all indicted that younger workers provided for important sources of productivity

that also served the economy well. Overall, these and other studies clearly contested the myths that

immigrants were a drain on the economy.

The second criticism leveled against immigrants is that they take jobs away from American

workers or that they negatively impact wages. Again, several studies refuted that (Chomsky 2007).

For example, the National Academy of Science study found the wage impact to be negligible, while

the President’s Report found little impact on wages of native Americans (105-106). The report also

noted and dismissed the argument that immigrants displaced American citizens in the labor market.

Instead, they often filled in gaps abandoned by others, such as farming and agriculture, and they

definitely constituted a new source of productive labor particularly at a time when the size of the

labor pool for other workers had disappeared.

In addition to the above studies a Pew Hispanic Center (2006) reached similar conclusions.

It compared the economic growth in selected states with high versus low immigration and found no

differences in economic growth or in its impact on the labor markets. It also found that there was

in fact in 12 states a positive correlation between the growth of immigrant and native-born workers.

By that, there was no evidence that instates where more immigrants entered the labor market it

depressed the entry of others into work. Finally, even among immigrants who were young and

32

lacking in education, there was no indication that they directly competed against and hurt native-

born workers with similar background.

In sum, the evidence that immigrants are financial drains on the economy and that they take

jobs away or hurt the wages of native-born workers is wanting. There may be short-term impacts

in selected areas where local governments are burdened by immigrants, but both overall and among

sport labor markets, it was a myth that immigrants hurt the economy or workers in the way critics

of immigration allege.

10. Legislative term limits will dismantle incumbent advantages, break ties to special interests,

and discourage career politicians.

The idea of legislative term limits have deep roots in American politics. Dating back to the

Anti-Federalists and their critique of the new constitution, advocates of term limits see in them

important values, including the republican idea of rotation in office to produce citizen-legislators.

Yet frustration with special interest politics or the apparent corruption of career politicians lead to

the passage of legislative term limits in 21 states during the 1990s. The idea behind the recent

movement for term limits is the belief that many of the ills affecting state legislative politics is

rooted in career politicians who place self-interest above the public’s interest, or who are otherwise

embedded in lobbyist or special interest networks that make it impossible for them to legislate.

Moreover, advocates also believed that term limits would change the type of people serving in

legislatures, increase and promote competitive elections, and would change how work and power

is allocated (Cain, Hanley, and Kousser (2006).

Have term limits lived up to their expectations as an important reform tool? At best, their

33

reforms have fallen far short of their desired outcomes, while at worst, they have had a negative

impact on many aspects of legislative politics and power and, in some cases, have produced effects

almost exactly counter to what was desired.

One of the earliest and most comprehensive studies on legislative term limits was an edited

volume The Test of Time (Farmer, Rausch, and Green 2003). Written only within a couple of years

after some of the first legislatures were experiencing the initial impact of the term limits, the various

articles in this volume concluded that the limits produced results that suggested “substantive, but

mixed” results (5). For example, there was little evidence of a change in who ran for office, although

there were modest gains in some states for women and minorities (6). Term limits seemed to have

little impact on career incentives, with many of these individuals running for other offices or taking

appointed political positions or becoming lobbyists (Powell 2003: 144). There was little evidence

of increased competition for offices and, in fact, because career politicians continued to cycle their

way through offices, there was some evidence that this phenomena (along with increased campaign

costs for open seats) created new impediments for citizens contemplating a bid for office. Moreover,

partisanship seemed to increase, knowledge among legislators decreased, and the ties to lobbyists

and special interests that was supposed to break generally failed to materialize (Farmer, Rausch, and

Green 2003). Finally, leadership skills in the legislature seemed weaker and the power of this branch

of government overall diminished vis-a-vis the governor and executive branch. Perhaps the only real

change that did occur in terms of what term limit advocates had hoped for was the production of

more open seats.

Subsequent studies seemed to confirm these initial conclusions. Cain, Hanley, and Kousser

(2006) found that while more seats were contested, the races were not necessarily more competitive.

34

Term limits also did not seem to produce party turnout of seats, more citizen responsiveness, or less

bias (218). Sarbaugh-Thompson, et al (2002; 2004) found little if no evidence that term limits in

Michigan produced increased voter turnout, weakened incumbency advantages, or increased more

competitive elections. They also found that the elections under term limits generally cost more, did

not necessarily make candidates less reliant upon special interest or lobbyist money, and that, in

many cases, led to an increase in more self-financed wealthy candidates running. In short, they saw

little evidence that term limits in Michigan attracted more citizen legislators (Sarbaugh-Thompson

2004: 187) or that it diversified the legislature much from what was previously seen. Among the 11

promises they list that term limits advocates hoped their reforms would achieve, Sarbaugh-

Thompson found only three of them were secured, with the remainder failing (191).

Kousser (2005) also concurred with many of the results noted above. However, in his

research he examined how the increased professionalism of legislatures (more pay or staff, for

example) and term limits impacted this branch of government. His conclusion was that term limits

offset any legislative improvements that were produced by professionalism. He also found that

generally term limits changed the knowledge and skill level of legislators and, most importantly, had

a damaging impact both up policy innovation and time lines for legislators (202). Term-limited

legislators were less likely to look to policies that had longer time horizons for success, and generally

less knowledgeable officeholders had less time to work on policies or dra upon their skills and

experience to craft more innovative policies. Instead, they seemed more likely to follow what had

been developed elsewhere, or relied upon ideas from staff or lobbyists.

Kousser (2005) as well as other research also reinforced much of what the initial research had

tentatively concluded. Term limits strengthened the executive branch, especially with the budget,

35

and failed to produce a new type of legislator. Research by Schaffner, Wagner, and Winburn (2004)

indicated that term limits made redistricting more partisan. Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000) found

little demographic change in term-limited legislatures, while Carroll and Jenkins (2001) found little

evidence that female candidates benefitted from the reform. Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000) also

noted increased partisanship, less cooperation in bicameral bodies, a shifting of power towards the

governor, and a decrease in legislative knowledge and innovation. A 2006 study by the National

Council of State Legislatures reached similar results.

To summarize, term limits as a “throw the bums out” strategy have failed to live up to their

promise as a significant political reform and, in some cases, may actually weaken the very values its

advocates wanted to promote. Term limits, if not a waste of money, certainly cannot be described

as a successful reform but instead one that seems failed to solve the problems they were designed

to address.

IV. Why Stupid Public Policies and Political Myths Never Die

If the evidence suggests that some public policy ideas are myths or are shown to be defective

based upon social science research, how can one explain their immortality? Several theses are

possible.

First, perhaps the most simple answer is that many elected officials, policy makers, and

members of the public may be unaware that the policies do not work. It may also be that the lack

of staff time and resources at the state and local level reinforce this ignorance. If the research on

term limits is accurate, less experienced legislators might be more likely to repeat these failures.

Even though this paper has potentially run roughshod over some of the nuances of the

36

research regarding the different policies discussed, there is no question that many policy makers may

well be unaware or unable to digest the various studies on welfare migration, economic development,

or any of the other topics under discussion here. Given that many policy makers may rely upon

almost a word of mouth in constructing policies, they simply may be outside the information loop

when it comes to policy evaluation. Moreover, they may simply not be able to appreciate the

differences or significance of what social scientists are arguing, or the latter may not be very good

at communicating their thoughts and speaking to the broader public.

A second argument for the persistence of stupid policies and myths is a belief that if it works

in one place will work in another, or that while it did not work somewhere else, this time or in this

place it is different. There are two problems here. The first argument relies upon a false aggregation

thesis. By that, something that works in Chicago should also work here. However, not every place

is Chicago, and the novelty or scarcity of an attraction may make it a draw in a limited number of

cities, but not one when the market is flooded with them. Conversely, policymakers, while

acknowledging that a stadium plan did not work elsewhere, will argue that this time it is different

because the sports subsidy now is embedded in, for example, a broader commercial revitalization

project. Thus, unlike the failures of the past, this project learns from their mistakes and will work.

More cynically, there are also several reasons why stupid public policies and political myths

persist. Interest group politics, as well as the impact of money in politics, could account for why

some policies endure despite evidence to the contrary. In the case of welfare migration and

immigration, fear and prejudice may drive the topics. In other cases, partisan or personal electoral

political may explain why elected officials push three strikes laws. Here, despite whatever one may

know intellectually, politically it may be pragmatic to push specific policies for personal gain.

37

Furthermore, and even more cynically, perhaps those individuals and groups who are most likely to

be pressing many of these unsuccessful policy ideas are those who least support an activist

government. Thus, while at the same time engaging in rent-seeking behavior they are also setting

the government up to fail. The result is that this both reinforces the idea that the government is the

problem, not the solution, and it feeds upon public cynicism towards it.

Another reason why some policies live on may be rooted in the narrow political orientations

found within American culture. Given a basically pro-market orientation towards the economy,

appeals to market incentives might well determine what types of economic solutions may be offered

by political leaders and be considered acceptable by the public. For example, when Francois

Mitterand was elected the Socialist President of France he was asked if he planned nationalize a

specific French car company. He replied no, asking why he would take over a company losing

money. Instead, he wanted to take over businesses making money so that it could finance

government programs. In the United States, nationalizing a business, especially a profitable one,

would clearly cut against the grain of the ideology of many.

But there are two final reasons for the immortality of some policy ideas. First, perhaps

politics and political choices are not about reason but passion. By that, David Hume, Edelman

(1985), and recent works by Frank (2005) and Westin (2007) may be correct—politics and policy

making is not rational, but more symbolic and emotive. This means regardless of what research

may suggest, policy ideas are driven by variables other than disinterested reason. Second, the

persistence of often repeated failed policies may speak Brandeis’ assertion that states are laboratories

of democracy. Perhaps they should not be so characterized. Instead, states may be more often than

not described as displaying a lack of innovation. In reaching this conclusion, researchers almost

38

need to invert the diffusion literature, asking not why or how states innovate, but how do they

mindlessly replicate policy mistakes and myths.

V.

Conclusion

“Stupid is as stupid does.” So said Forrest Gump of the motion picture by the same name,

in referring to how stupid individuals do stupid things. While this paper examined only ten stupid

public policies and other political myths, a host of others—including public subsidies for casinos and

lotteries, privatization of government services as a cost savings device, and the myth of government

ineptitude—warrant exploration and demolition. Governments may not be inherently stupid, but

oftentimes they pursue policies that fit that category.

This paper has examined stupid public policies and political myths within the context of the

literature on state diffusion and innovation in order to raise several questions. First, it looked at the

gap between political myth and social science research, asking how the political process can be better

informed when policy is made. It also queries to whether policy making should be data-driven.

These two questions reflect the often contrasting perspectives of elected and appointed officials who

see the world from different vantage points. While many would like to see budgets, policy, and laws

reflect good social science evidence that is rational, others may say that all three of these items are

political issues that reflect clashing ideologies and values.

Second, this paper asked questions about state innovation and learning. While the diffusion

literature has sought to understand how jurisdictions learn, this paper has suggested that the

innovation is less than meets the eye. States may adopt policies from elsewhere but how good of a

job do they do in learning from the mistakes of others. It is not clear they do, raising questions about

39

the laboratories of democracy label often pinned on to states. Third, the paper sought to document

ten policies or myths that never die, despite their repetition, questioning why they continue to live

on despite their bankruptcy. If in fact the government is inevitably going to make policy, it should

at least do so in a way that generates value for the taxpayer (Osborne and Hutchinson (2004).

Finally, the paper questions the motives and interests of those who advocate for failed

policies. The concern here is what are the broader or more narrow political agendas that drive

groups and individuals to push for them.

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