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KATERINA KOLOZOVA

University American College, Skopje

THE FIGURE OF THE STRANGER:

A POSSIBILITY FOR TRANSCENDENTAL MINIMALISM OR RADICAL SUBJECTIVITY

L’homme est cet Idiot qui existe aussi

comme Humanité universelle ou Etranger (François Laruelle)

1. The Stranger as a Radical Term and Fundament of a Radical Theory of Human

Subjectivity

he question I would like to explore here is: What could the figure of the “Stranger “ mean

in the contemporary debate on subjectivity, humanism, and its radicalizations in the

forms of post-humanism, trans-humanism, non-humanism and other “humanisms with a

prefix”? The anachronistic and metaphorical idea of the “Stranger” from the pre-structuralist

period has been replaced by concepts of Subjectivity – indebted to the Lacanian theoretical

legacy of the “barred Subject” – which share one fundamental presupposition: subjectivization

is always already self-estrangement, implying that the wholeness of the true Self is an

impossibility.

Following François Laruelle, I concede the idea of the “Stranger” is necessary for a rigorous and

non-philosophical theorizing of the Self since it overcomes the dualistic split created by the

dyad of the “Real” and the “Subject.” Here, I would propose that resurrecting the figure of the

“Stranger” is a necessary radicalization of the idea of human subjectivity.

According to Laruelle’s non-standard philosophy, concepts are radical when they are

minimally transcendental and essentially descriptive of the Real (Laruelle 1989, 50; 2000, 47).

The Real is impossible to be grasped by thought in its fullness, thought does not reflect it – it

merely correlates with it by assuming a unilateral position, since the Real is radically indifferent

to Thought. (Therefore, there is no reciprocity, no inter-mirroring, no relation – merely

T

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unilateral correlating of Thought with the Real.)1

One of the “first names” of the Real is the

lived (le vecu), explains Laruelle in his Théorie des Etrangers, first published in 1995. The Human-

in-the-Human or the Human in its last instance (that of the Real) is made of the sheer lived (also

called joui-sans-jouissance), and being a Subject means being made of “transcendental

material,” thus being fundamentally estranged from the Human in its aspect of immanence (the

Real). The Subject establishes a relation of exteriority to it (Laruelle 1995, 166)2 and, seen in its

last instance (or radically and inalienably),3 it is the “Stranger” at the heart of the Human-in-

Human. This concept admits and affirms the Dyad between the Real, the lived or “le joui sans

jouissance” (Larulle 1995, 221-223) the Human-in-Human (or the Human-in-the-last-instance) is

and the “Subject,” while remaining radically descriptive or minimally transcendental.

“Subject” or any other transcendentally loaded term attempts to normalize the experience of the

Dyad, annul its lived effect by way of compensating through “meaning.” In the case of the post-

Lacanian legacies of theories of subjectivity it all comes down to the realization that the

estranged Subject is all we have, can possess and control, therefore – we are nothing but

spectral subjectivities always already alienated from the Real. Laruelle’s unilateral affirming of

the irreconcilable difference between the (mute) real and the (linguistic) subject aims at also

affirming the lived reality of the radical estrangement as taking place in the Real. The lived (le

vécu) is what takes place on – or makes – the plane of the Real. The estranging presence of the

Subject (which is always already “philosophical,” says Laruelle) and the Subconscious (with its

transcendentally conditioned contents) is experienced, lived in the “Ego-in-Ego,” which, insofar

as it is the terrain of the Lived, can be understood as the Real (Laruelle 1995, 222).4 The Subject

is always transcendentally informed; it is shaped by and for the World5 and if we want to

radicalize this concept, which is done by way of correlating it with the Real or following the

“syntax of the Real” (Laruelle 2000, 46-47), we would have to come to the most rudimentary,

transcendentally minimalistic, descriptive of the Real (the lived) idea of the “Stranger.” And it is

1 Evidently, Laruelle’s term “correlation” has not only different but also opposed meaning to

Meillassoux’s idea of “correlation” which refers precisely the tradition of thought which considers the

Real inaccessible to thought; Laruelle believes in the radical indifference of the Real, in the

impossibility of Thought reflecting the Real, but he also argues that Thought can “describe,” theorize

the Real while admitting its cognitive inaccessibility in the last instance.

2 « Ce sont [les Etrangers] des points (d’) extériorité, ce ne sont pas de toute façon des « individus » ou

des « sujets, » ni des corps empirico-idéalisés, toujours divisible, ni des « Dasein,» mais des

phénomènes vécus-en-dernière-instance de l’extériorité à l’état-Multitudes. » (Laruelle 1995, 196)

3 « ‘Radical’ ne signifie pas autre chose qu’inaliénable ou que « de-dernière-instance » (Laruelle 1995,

196)

4 « Toutefois il est possible – c’est notre liberté axiomatique – d’identifier le Joui et un autre ‘nom

premier’, l’‘Ego’, si celui-ci est alors défini comme Ego-en-Ego : ce n’est pas ré-insérer l’analyse, au

contraire, dans un contexte psycho-métaphysique. D’une manière général le Joui est le nom premier –

celui du Réel – et le type de réel qui explique que, s’il y a une pensée (‘inconsciente’) commandée par

lui, elle procédera par ‘noms premiers’ philosophiquement et analytiquement indéfinissables et

indémontrables, comme le réel (du) Joui lui-même […] » (Laruelle 1995, 222-223)

5 “World” is Laruellian term which is analogous to the meaning of notions such as the “discursive

universe,” or the Symbolic order (and the Imaginary it subsumes).

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primarily as such, as the “Stranger” within ourselves, that the subject is lived or “enjoyed-

without-enjoyment” (joui-sans-jouissance)6 in the Real we all are in the last instance, and

therefore it is the term which is best in accordance with the immanence of the Real (Laruelle

2000, 47), descriptive (as science is descriptive) without any transcendental gesture added to it.

2. What is the Stranger Made Of, According to Laruelle

“The Strangers are radical subjectivities”, says Laruelle, rather than “persons, individuals or

subjects in the technical transcendental sense of the word” (Laruelle 1995, 166).7 Although it is

made of “transcendental material” – it is a subjectivity; therefore, it is made of concepts issuing

from the thinkable world or the word of thinkability; it is radical since it is lived in the last

instance as that “point of exteriority” at the heart of Ego-en-Ego (Laruelle 1995, 166).

Unlike Lacan’s barred Subject, the radical subjectivity (that is the Stranger), as defined by

Laruelle, possesses a “concrete body” or a “flesh” which is not “empirico-metaphysical”

(Laruelle 1995, 164). It is a body made of the “Multitudes of transcendental material” (Laruelle

1995, 166).8 The “empirical body” would be equally transcendental as the “metaphysical one,”

since both are product of transcendental mediation of the effects of the fundamentally

indifferent Real. Therefore, instead of endorsing doctrinally accomplished constructions such as

the “empirical” or “the metaphysical,” Laruelle argues for their rendering chôra, which is an

unorganized, sheer “transcendental material” the non-standard philosophical approach can

make use of in ways which are not doctrinally predetermined but rather “succumb to the

authority” of the unpredictable, unruly Real (Laruelle 1992, 93). Correlating with the Real,

which is indifferent to Thought’s pretension to reflect it, describing it while affirming its

unilateral difference and inaccessibility in the last instance, is fundamentally a scientific

approach. This is why Laruelle insists that the “body” of the “Stranger” should be defined in

terms of science (Laruelle 1995, 165). In fact, Theorie des Etrangers (1995) is a book that seeks to

set the foundations of a science of the humans, a science understood precisely in the way just

explained—by way of thought which expresses fidelity to the authority of the real rather than

to a doctrinal legacy.

Non-analysis, which is the Laruellian, non-standard version of psychoanalysis, argues that the

true object of its study should be the Real, which is surely inaccessible in the last instance, but

is, nonetheless, accessible to thought which unilaterally attempts to describe it, theorize and/or

6 In Laruelle’s Théorie des Etrangers, “le joui” is yet another name for the lived (le vecu) the Real the

“Human” in its last instance is, whereas jouissance entails the transcendental of/for the joui. Joui is

fundamentally traumatic, it is merely the lived, the experienced, the enjoyed which is free of quality -

7 « Concrètement les Etrangers ne sont pas des personnes, des individus ou des sujets au sens

philosophique transcendant de ces mots ; ce sont bien de toute façon des subjectivités radicales, mais

en dernière instance ; et ce qui leur tien lieu de corps – de corps transi par cette subjectivité -, est de

l’ordre de ces entités sans différence et tissées dans la transcendance du vide. » (166 Theorie des

Etrangers)

8 « On peut appeler « chair » les Multitudes transcendantales=X… » (Laruelle, Théorie des Etrangers,

166)

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scientifically explicate its workings without aspiring to reflect it. The transcendental material

which is the body of the “Stranger” – and the subjectivities that issue from it – represents a

positive reality inasmuch as it is lived in the Ego, but only it the last instance (which is its

radical or inalienable identity). It is the effects, workings for and in the Real taking place in the

Ego-in-Ego – or the reality of the lived – that should be explained by non-standard

psychoanalysis rather than the “Subconscious” which is a pure product of the Transcendental

or of “idealism” (Laruelle 1995, 196).

One ought to strive to explain occurrences of the Joui, their effects and the causes of change they

represent for the subjectivities, rather than the self-mirroring of Jouissance which is but a

rendition of philosophy and works as an intervention of the transcendental into the Real or the

lived. Such a posture of thought is one which will give results in explicating how Jouissance

violates the realm of the Joui by usurping its territory. This usurpation takes place by way of

Jouissance (the transcendental of enjoyment) claiming the status of the Joui (the Real or the Lived

which is le Joui, independent from jouissance): even if the Joui results from the workings of

Jouissance, it is a distinct phenomenon; its identity in the last instance belongs to the pre-lingual

realm of the Real. As an occurrence in/of the Real, it ought to be viewed in its effect (and as a

potential cause for the transcendental) as such (real) and in terms of scientific aligning with the

syntax of the Real without the ambition to reflect it (Laruelle 2000, 46-47). It is something which

can be accomplished by producing thought in the “immanent way,” which Laruelle calls

“cloning” the Real into the “transcendental material” (Laruelle 2000, 47). According to this

logic, the effect of Joui, as result of operations of Jouissance, should be cloned by resorting to the

transcendental material provided by the “Order of Jouissance,” yet again treated as a “taking

place” of the Real, impenetrable in the last instance by the transcendental.

The claim of non-standard psychoanalysis is that the Real of experiences of selfhood should be

the subject of its study rather than the self-sufficient self-mirroring of philosophy (analogous to

the concept of “World” explained above) reflected into all forms of transcendental

configurations of the self (such as the Subject, the Ego, etc.). Certainly, the latter are subjects of

study of Laruellian non-analysis; nonetheless, in non-analysis, they are viewed in the last

instance as positive realities, as instances of the Real (Laruelle 1995, 165).9 The Subject, in its last

instance, is the “Stranger” inhabiting the radically solitary and fundamentally vulnerable real of

the “Human-in-Human” we all are (the Real each of us in his/her last instance is). It is this

incursion of alien/ating presence into the exposed flesh of the radically passive Real in its

aspect of the Joui I would like to look at more closely in the following, closing section of this

article.

9 “[…] le mixte est unitéralisé sous la préposition de l’Etranger =x ? Que ce qui est dissous n’est pas le

mixte compris comme imbrication sans réalité propre de deux dimensions comme unité-des-

contraires, concept abstrait et purement syntaxique […] mais le mixte comme spontané ou supposé

suffisant […] mais de suspendre son usage suffisant ou philosophique et de discerner le résidu-de-

mixte tel du moins qu’il est alors vécu-en-Ego ou rapporte de l’Un (en) Ego. » (Laruelle 1995, 165)

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3. The Gaping Certainty of Estrangement as the Real

If the Real is by definition what is neither Language nor Thought, the Subject, that sheer

transcendental, is an alien instance living at its heart. It is an implantation that is not only alien

by its status (transcendental) vis-à-vis the Real, which is of a radically different status (that of

immanence), but also alienating. It is what re-presents the Real of the human identity in the last

instance by way of mediating it via that which is radically alien to it, the Language. This

estranging force is by necessity endowed with the pretension to be the “true Self,” whereby an

automatism or spontaneity is established by which Truth replaces the Real – the former gains

higher authority than the latter, becoming the “real reality” of the Real. Philosophical truth has

always aspired to re-create the Real via “meaning” seeking to fix its status of “being real” by

way of “legitimizing” it as the Real (via Truth). The Truth is that amphibological instance at

which thought decides to take the place of the real by being the “truth of it.” It would seem that

this essentially philosophical procedure10 implies that the Real would be less real if devoid of

meaning and, hence, of truth (that mimicking of the Real by thought, resulting into the only

recognized real – the “meaningful real”). Truth, therefore the transcendental, usurps the status

of the Real, and it is at this point that estrangement begins to take place.

The Real is the only certainty of ourselves we necessarily experience as such, and that

experience of certainty is made of “the sheer lived” we all are in the last instance. Thus, I am

referring to the notion of certainty in its sense of immanence – of the inalienable, inalterable,

inexorable “being there,” of the lived each “human-in-human” is in the last instance. This utter

experience, this absolute Lived is overwhelming. It is invasive since it is an elemental force, or

rather it is pure force. Therefore, it is necessarily mediated, and mediation is by definition a

working of the transcendental (i.e., of signification or of Language). For the mediation to take

place the human-in-human must execute the auto-alienating gesture of instituting the

“Stranger” which will re-present and mediate the suffocating Real one is in the last instance.

One is necessarily alienated. The instance of the “Stranger” is forcibly, by necessity, introduced

as an inalienable instance (of alienation) at the heart of immanence. However, the usurpation of

the status of the Real carried out by the transcendental (the material the “Stranger” is made of)

is a violent gesture, or gesture of violence, consisting in the act of stripping the Real of its

identity in the last instance (that of the immanently real). It is an attempt toward effacing the

Real, i.e., the Lived, by substituting it with the spectral transcendental. The sense of utter

estrangement, of auto-negation of the immanence one is in his/her last instance, is the source of

the experience of undergoing a process of violence—of violation of that vulnerable instance of

passivity the Real is and an alienation marked by transcendence rather than immanence (which

is the source of that primary gesture of establishing the instance of the “Stranger”).

10 Philosophical, in the sense of Laruelle’s established equation between the World and Philosophy (the

discursive, lingual universe laying out the Laws according to which we first understand ourselves in

this world and than live according to these understandings and the “meanings” of life as prescribed by

World=Philosophy).

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If one resorts to the unilateral affirmation of the identity-in-the-last-instance of each of the

elements of the Dyad, by virtue of resisting to any desire to unify the two and efface the reality

of dualism, one is not caught into the sense of a “split self” since Unity of the Two (the

transcendental and the Real) was never either desired nor expected. Therefore, the threat of the

violent experience of the “split I,” of self-alienation (in both Marxian and Freudian sense of the

word) is sidestepped. The “Stranger” is radical subjectivity and, considering that “radical”

comes down to the “inalienable” (Laruelle 1995, 196), it is experienced in its unilaterally

established identity in the last instance, in the sense of the real of its determination in the last

instance –an instance of the transcendental correlating with the Real or “affected by immanence”

(Laruelle 2000, 47).

The mute Real we are molded from and into, is inalienably and invasively there – and

unilaterally so. And it necessitates the “Stranger” to transform the stoicheion it is into the

controllable and translucent instance of Death sinking its teeth into the unstoppable force of the

Lived in order to render it bearable. Unilaterally affirming the “Stranger” in us – or the

“Stranger” that we are – without an attempt to transcend its radical alterity vis-à-vis the Real,

without an attempt to efface the difference in the last instance between the real of the human

and the transcendental of the world, produces thinking and acting in fidelity to the Real. This

fidelity, which Laruelle also calls “thought affected by immanence,” enables us to evade the

sense of being subject to the threatening alienating force of the doubly transcendentally

constructed “strangers” (the modern men and women are, according to the variety existentialist

views) invading “our true self”: The truth of ourselves is never ours, whereas what is ours (the

Real, the lived) is always indifferent to any truth.

KATERINA KOLOZOVA is professor of philosophy and gender studies at the University American College in Skopje.

She holds a Ph.D. in philosophy and she is also visiting professor at several universities in former Yugoslavia and

Bulgaria. During 2008-2009, Kolozova was a visiting scholar at the Department of Rhetoric (Program of Critical

Theory) at the University of California-Berkeley. Kolozova is the author of “The Lived Revolution: Solidarity with

the Body in Pain As the New Political Universal,” The Real and “I”: On the Limit and the Self (in English), The Crisis of

the Subject with Judith Butler and Zarko Trajanoski (in English and in Macedonian), The Death and the Greeks: On

Tragic Concepts of Death from Antiquity to Modernity (in Macedonian), and editor of a number of books from the fields

of gender studies and feminist theory, most recently the co-edited volume, with Svetlana Slapshak and Jelisaveta

Blagojevic, Gender and Identity: Theories from/on Southeastern Europe. (Belgrade: Belgrade Women’s Studies and

Gender Research Center and Athena Network, 2006). She is also Editor in Chief of the journal Identities, member

of the Editorial Board of Punctum Books, member of the Non-Philosophical Society (ONPHI) of AOIFE and the

European Network for Gender and Women’s Studies, ATHENA.

©Katerina Kolozova.

Kolozova, Katerina. “The Figure of the Stranger: A Possibility for Transcendental Minimalism or Radical

Subjectivity,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 11 no. 3 (Fall 2011): 59-64.